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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis investigates the efficacy of U.S. security cooperation for advancing 
peace and stability in the Persian Gulf. It asks why the ongoing regional instability is 
disproportionate to the United States’ investment. The thesis examines the U.S. 
relationships with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in the post-9/11 
environment through two case studies and posits that dysfunctional partnerships have 
prevented the United States from achieving its foreign policy goals. The case studies 
reveal that although the U.S. partnerships were nominally functional, U.S. policy 
increasingly focused on two activities working at cross-purposes to regional stability. 
First, security cooperation efforts emphasized transferring the burden of security to 
regional actors. Second, U.S. security cooperation prioritized optimizing the benefits 
from arming those same regional actors. Thus, the post-9/11 paradigm represents a shift 
from pursuing regional policy goals towards realizing benefits. The ongoing state of 
regional instability in the Persian Gulf appears to be partially explained by the unintended 
consequences of the United States’ post-9/11 regional security paradigm. Consequently, 
U.S. security cooperation may need to conform to a goals-centered approach, thereby 
sacrificing benefits, if the United States intends to make regional peace and stability a 
policy priority. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
In May 2019, the United States announced the deployment of the USS Abraham 
Lincoln carrier strike group, a B-52 task force, and thousands of U.S. military personnel to 
deter Iranian aggression in the Persian Gulf.1 Soon after, a spate of attacks attributed to 
Iran against merchant vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz threatened to disrupt the 
world’s oil supply.2 In an effort to curb Iranian aggression, the United States declared 
emergency arms sales worth $8 billion to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.3 
Soon after, an undeterred Iran destroyed a $130 million U.S. Global Hawk operating over 
international waters.4 By September 2019, a swarm of Iranian missiles and drones crashed 
into the Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities in eastern Saudi Arabia in what former Secretary 
Pompeo called “an unprecedented attack on the world’s energy supply.”5 Accompanying 
the escalating crisis with Iran, in Yemen, the Human Rights Watch organization reported 
that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were causing the largest humanitarian 
crisis in the world.6 Concurrently, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were leading 
an aggressive campaign to isolate Qatar. The fallout from the Qatar rift threatens to fracture 
the U.S.-supported framework that has formed the cornerstone of regional security in the 
1 Matt Spetalnick and Idrees Ali, “U.S. Deploying Carrier, Bombers to Middle East to Deter Iran: 
Bolton,” Reuters, May 5, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran/u-s-deploying-carrier-bombers-
to-middle-east-to-deter-iran-bolton-idUSKCN1SC01B.  
2 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Review of Maritime Transport 
2019, UNCTAD/RMT/2019/Corr.1 (Geneva: United Nations, 2019), 21, https://unctad.org/system/files/ 
official-document/rmt2019_en.pdf.  
3 Clayton Thomas et al., Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. 
Policy, CRS Report No. R44984 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2020), 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R44984. 
4 Jim Garamone, “Iran Shoots Down U.S. Global Hawk Operating in International Airspace,” U.S. 
Department of Defense, June 20, 2019, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1882497/ 
iran-shoots-down-us-global-hawk-operating-in-international-airspace/. 
5 “Saudi Arabia Oil and Gas Production Reduced by Drone Strikes,” BBC, September 14, 2019, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-49703143.  
6 “Yemen: Events of 2019,” Human Rights Watch, January 14, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2020/country-chapters/yemen. 
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Persian Gulf.7 The ongoing crises in the Persian Gulf challenge the core premise of U.S. 
security cooperation: namely, as a means for the United States to enhance regional stability.  
Despite decades of investment, U.S. security cooperation in the Persian Gulf 
appears to have fallen short of improving regional stability. In terms of monetary value, 
from 1950–2020, the United States provided $172B worth of weapons and training to Saudi 
Arabia, making it the largest recipient of U.S. security sector assistance in the world.8 
During the same period, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) records indicate 
the United States provided $90B worth of arms and training to the other five Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) monarchies under various arms deals and service contracts.9 
The weapons and training include some of the best systems and programs in the world. For 
example, the U.S. delivered a complete modernization package for the Saudi Armed 
Forces, including the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) air defense system.10 The 
United States also delivered the F-16E/F “Desert Falcon” to the UAE, the most advanced 
F-16 variant in the world, more advanced than the F-16 C/D in the U.S. inventory.11 
Similarly, Qatar received the F-15QA (Qatar Advanced), considered the most sophisticated 
Eagle variant ever built and the model for the USAF’s future EX variant.12 In addition to 
the top-class prestige weaponry, the United States also trained sixty thousand officers and 
trainees from all of the GCC military services.13 The training included four-year service 
 
7 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Implications of the Qatar Crisis for Regional Security in the Gulf,” 
AlSharq Strategic Research, June 29, 2017, https://research.sharqforum.org/2017/06/29/implications-of-
the-qatar-crisis-for-regional-security-in-the-gulf/; Anna L. Jacobs, “Resolution of Gulf Rift Not Likely to 
Mend Fault Lines in North Africa,” The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, January 21, 2021, 
https://agsiw.org/resolution-of-gulf-rift-not-likely-to-mend-fault-lines-in-north-africa/.  
8 “DSCA Historical Sales Book,” Defense Security Cooperation Agency, accessed June 24, 2021, 
https://www.dsca.mil/resources/dsca-historical-sales-book.  
9 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “DSCA Historical Sales Book.”  
10 SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (accessed 27 April 2021), www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers. 
11 “The Most Advanced F-16s in the World aren’t American,” Defense Industry Daily, December 09, 
2020, https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/the-uaes-f-16-block-60-desert-falcon-fleet-04538/. 
12 Stefano D’Urso, “The Most Advanced Version of the F-15 Eagle, the F-15QA, Just Made its First 
Flight,” Business Insider, April 17, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/most-advanced-version-of-f15-
eagle-f15qa-made-first-flight-2020-4. 
13 “Foreign Military Training and DOD Engagement Activities of Interest,” Department of State, 
accessed July 24, 2021, (Foreign Military Training Joint Reports to Congress 2000–2019), 
https://www.state. gov/foreign-military-training-and-dod-engagement-activities-of-interest/. 
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academy programs, graduate programs, pilot training, English-language courses, 
counterterrorism, and special operations courses.14 However, despite long-standing U.S. 
patronage, the ongoing war in Yemen, the Qatar rift, and the Iran crisis in the Gulf suggest 
the United States’ Gulf partners are not only unable to maintain regional stability, but they 
are also destabilizing the region. The UAE’s alleged illicit U.S. arms transfers to proxy 
forces in Libya, and Saudi Arabia’s poor battlefield performance in Yemen also suggests 
U.S. security cooperation, as a means to achieve U.S. policy goals, is not working as 
intended.15 The disparity between the United States’ seventy years of security sector 
assistance in the Gulf and the questionable return on investment have led many experts to 
conclude that U.S. security cooperation in the Gulf has failed.16 While most criticism has 
not been empirically tested, at first glance, the ongoing tensions in the region challenge the 
efficacy of U.S. security cooperation in the Persian Gulf and raise questions about whether 
there are any substantive opportunities for improvement.  
This thesis asks why the apparent security outcomes in the Gulf are so 
disproportionate to the level of investment and investigates whether the fault is due to the 
quality of the security cooperation relationship with partner nations. The project explores 
the efficacy of U.S. security cooperation in the Gulf, focusing on the two most influential 
actors in the region: Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. This line of inquiry 
prioritizes actionable insights for the practitioner in an effort to overcome what Walt 
14 Department of State, “Foreign Military Training and DOD Engagement Activities of Interest.” 
15 “Menendez Demands Investigation into Reports that UAE Illegally Gave U.S. Arms to Libyan 
Militants,” United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 02, 2019, www.foreign.senate.gov/ 
press/ranking/release/menendez-demands-investigation-into-reports-that-uae-illegally-gave-us-arms-to-
libyan-militants; Nadwa Al-Dawsari, “Running Around in Circles: How Saudi Arabia is Losing its War in 
Yemen to Iran,” Middle East Institute, March 3, 2020, https://www.mei.edu/publications/running-around-
circles-how-saudi-arabia-losing-its-war-yemen-iran. 
16 For a sampling of criticism see Andrew Miller and Daniel Mahanty, “U.S. Security Aid Is a Faith-
Based Policy,” Just Security, April 14, 2020, https://www.justsecurity.org/69533/u-s-security-aid-is-a-faith-
based-policy/; Andrew Exum, “U.S. Arms Sales to the Gulf Have Failed,” The Atlantic, June 21, 2019, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ ideas/archive/2019/06/us-military-support-gulf-all-backwards/592249/.; or 
Andrew Miller and Richard Sokolsky, “What Has $49 Billion in Foreign Military Aid Bought Us? Not 
Much,” The American Conservative, Feb 27, 2018, https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/ 
what-has-49-billion-in-foreign-military-aid-bought-us-not-much/. 
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describes as the theory-policy gap in academic scholarship.17 The intent is to establish 
objective confidence in the strategic rationale of U.S. security cooperation policy and 
praxis. This approach assumes that policy and praxis are inextricably linked together and 
that any successful policy in the Middle East results from deliberate planning and execution 
rather than the pursuit of aspirational goals.18 The research question asks why security 
assistance and cooperation appear to be failing in the Gulf and if it is an issue of failed 
policy, failed execution, or a failed security cooperation relationship. 
The thesis discriminates the effectiveness of security cooperation from the efficacy 
of security cooperation, the latter defined as the United States’ ability to wield success 
factors within its control. The distinction is relevant to this study for several reasons. First, 
the term efficacy differs from effectiveness in that it focuses on the United States’ ability 
to achieve deliberately defined goals and objectives, not just the presence of beneficial 
outcomes.19 Efficacy denotes specific attribution to the United States for achieving foreign 
policy objectives. Also, efficacy signifies agency beyond structural constraints. The 
concept is often described in terms of collective efficacy or an enterprise’s ability to 
coordinate and implement the actions necessary to achieve specified goals.20 The study’s 
focus on attribution enables an objective study of U.S. agency, the relationship between 
expectations and the capability to achieve them. Efficacy is an essential revision of the 
standard measures of effectiveness that emphasize the relationship between system inputs 
and correlative system changes.21 This study asserts that scholars have addressed the latter 
sufficiently, and a body of literature now exists to assess the efficacy of U.S. security 
cooperation. In short, the study assumes that what works and what does not is well-
 
17 Stephen M. Walt, “The Relationship Between Theory and Policy in International Relations,” 
Annual Review of Political Science, 8 (November 2005): 23–48, 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev/polisci.7.012003. 104904. 
18 Karl P. Mueller et al., U.S. Strategic Interests in the Middle East and Implications for the Army, PE-
265-A, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017, 7–8, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE265.html. 
19 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “efficacy,” accessed April 24, 2021, https://www.oed.com.  
20 Albert Bandura, Self-Efficacy: The Exercise of Control (New York: W.H. Freeman, 1997), 477. 
21 Gordon Raisbeck, “How the Choice of Measures of Effectiveness Constrains Operational 
Analysis,” Interfaces 9, no. 4, (August 1979): 85–93. https://doi.org/10.1287/inte.9.4.85. 
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established. What remains is evaluating how well the United States conforms to the 
established knowledge. 
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION
On the surface, the evolving dynamics in the Persian Gulf challenge the strategic
logic of U.S. security cooperation. According to U.S. statute, security cooperation includes 
all activities conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD) with a foreign country’s 
security establishment.22 The statute identifies three interrelated purposes of U.S. security 
cooperation: to develop a partner nation’s security for defense and multinational 
operations, to gain access to a partner nation’s territory or airspace, and to build 
relationships according to the national interests of the United States. Joint doctrine outlined 
in Joint Publication 3-20, emphasizes security cooperation as a means “to advance national 
security objectives, promote stability, prevent conflicts, and reduce the risk of having to 
employ U.S. military forces in a conflict.”23 In recent years, the concept increasingly 
focuses on enabling U.S. partners to take on the burden of ensuring their own.24 However, 
the academic literature reveals that arming foreign militaries increases the probability of 
conflict and reduces foreign policy cooperation with the United States.25 As a case in point, 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, both long-time recipients of U.S. security 
assistance, exhibit a new and dangerous military activism operating contrary to U.S. 
22 United States Code, Title 10 - Armed Forces, Sec. 301 Definitions (2018), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2018-title10/html/USCODE-2018-title10-subtitleA-partI-
chap16-subchapI-sec301.htm. 
23 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Security Cooperation, JP 3-20 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017), 
I-1, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_20_20172305.pdf.
24 Melissa G. Dalton et al., Shifting the Burden Responsibly: Oversight and Accountability in U.S. 
Security Sector Assistance (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019), 1. 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/shifting-burden-responsibly-oversight-and-accountability-us-security-sector-
assistance. 
25 Peter Rudloff and James Scott, “Buying Trouble? The Impact of Foreign Assistance on Conflict in 
Direct and Indirect Rivalry Situations,” All Azimuth 3, no. 1, (Jan 2014): 35–54, https://doi.org/10.20991/ 
allazimuth.167320; Patricia L. Sullivan, Brock F. Tessman, and Xiaojun Li, “US Military Aid and 
Recipient State Cooperation,” Foreign Policy Analysis 7, no. 3 (July 2011): 275–94, https://doi.org/10.1111 
/j.1743-8594.2011.00138.x.  
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interests.26 Their actions corroborate the paradoxical nature of U.S. security cooperation. 
By helping Gulf nations develop independent military capability, they now use that 
capability to pursue their own divergent interests.27 The United Arab Emirates’ and Saudi 
Arabia’s active involvement in Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Egypt exemplify the dilemma of 
U.S. security cooperation in the Gulf. It appears increasingly unlikely that U.S. security 
cooperation in the Gulf contributes to the intended foreign policy goals of maintaining 
regional stability. A study evaluating the efficacy of U.S. security cooperation will help 
policymakers and practitioners understand the limits and prospects of U.S. security 
cooperation and its role in achieving foreign policy goals.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Security Cooperation Institutional Perspectives 
There exists a persistent institutional dissonance in the United States regarding what 
security cooperation is. This dissonance creates a definitional dilemma where various 
government institutions define and approach security cooperation differently. Bilal Saab 
describes the institutional dissonance by stating, “the key actors involved in security 
cooperation—the White House, Congress, Department of Defense, and Department of 
State—do not have a unified understanding of security cooperation: what it is supposed to 
achieve, how to use and improve it, and how to tell if it is working.”28 Similarly, the 
Congressional Research Service argues that Congress and the State Department tend to 
think of security assistance and cooperation as a limited foreign policy tool, whereas the 
DOD conceptualizes the same as a broad military strategy.29 In further contrast, the White 
 
26Emile Hokayem and David B. Roberts, “The War in Yemen,” Survival 58, no. 6 (Nov 2016): 157–
186, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2016.1257202; Emma Soubrier, “Global and Regional Crises, 
Empowered Gulf Rivals, and the Evolving Paradigm of Regional Security,” in Shifting Global Politics in 
the Middle East, ed. Marc Lynch and Amaney Jamal (Washington, DC: POMEPS, 2019), 63–66. 
https://pomeps.org/pomeps-studies-34-shifting-global-politics-and-the-middle-east. 
27 Exum, “U.S. Arms Sales to the Gulf Have Failed.” 
28 Bilal Y. Saab, “Broken Partnerships: Can Washington Get Security Cooperation Right?” The 
Washington Quarterly 42, no. 3 (July 3, 2019): 77–89, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2019.1663120. 
29 Kathleen McInnis and Nathan Lucas, What Is ‘Building Partner Capacity? Issues for Congress, 
CRS Report No. R44313 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015), 15, https://www.hsdl. 
org/?abstract&did=789241. 
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House views arms sales as a flexible and expedient political tool distinct from security 
assistance or cooperation.30 As a consequence of institutional dissonance, assessing 
security assistance and cooperation depends on the tacit expectations and assumptions of 
the concept. This may explain why there is no consensus on the efficacy of security 
cooperation or how to evaluate the endeavor.  
Further complicating the definitional dilemma is that security cooperation remains 
an unresolved puzzle of international relations theory. The Handbook of International 
Relations suggests that no IR theory provides a satisfactory explanation for security 
cooperation, defined simply as state-to-state cooperation in the field of security.31 
According to the handbook, realist approaches fail to address the relative abundance of 
cooperative agreements in an anarchic system. Liberalism fails to account for variations in 
security cooperation relationships, especially between democratic and non-democratic 
states. Constructivism falls short of offering any distinct hypotheses to account for 
expected behaviors.32 In volume one of his three-volume treatise on military assistance, 
William Mott IV argues that the subject does not conform to a discrete discipline but may 
be its own type or mode of international relations.33 Mott also concludes, “As arms 
transfers become market transactions and lose the trappings of diplomacy, it is becoming 
clear that neither economics nor political science is very good at explaining or predicting 
military assistance, in any form.”34 He argues that the doctrinal scholarship fails to offer 
the cross-disciplinary approach necessary to understand the subject.35 As an unresolved 
puzzle, there is no established theoretical framework to help explain, predict, or evaluate 
security cooperation. 
30 A. Trevor Thrall and Caroline Dorminey, “Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign 
Policy,” CATO Institute, Mar 13, 2018, https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-
sales-us-foreign-policy. 
31 Harald Müller, “Security Cooperation,” in Handbook of International Relations, ed. Walter 
Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A Simmons (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2013), 626.  
32 Müller, “Security Cooperation,” 626–627. 
33 William H. Mott IV, Military Assistance: An Operational Perspective (Westport: Greenwood Press, 
1999), xii. 
34 Mott IV, Military Assistance: An Operational Perspective, 16. 
35 Mott IV, Military Assistance: An Operational Perspective, 19. 
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One possible resource for understanding security cooperation is evolutionary game 
theory’s concept of enduring competition. Andrew Kydd suggests that evolutionary game 
theory (EGT) models may help explain security cooperation behavior over an infinite time 
period.36 According to Kydd, some models demonstrate that nations are engaged in an 
enduring game of competition in which there is no end state, only cyclical patterns of 
conflict and temporary periods of peace. Paradoxically, the proliferation of peace 
incentivizes conflict by making conflict more lucrative. Along the same lines, Echevarria 
argues that instability is the enduring condition of the social order; therefore, the idea of 
maintaining a durable peace is “unwarranted and unsustainable.”37 His research implies 
that perpetual effort and resources are required to impose temporary pockets of stability in 
a naturally volatile world. The Department of Defense only recently began to adopt similar 
conclusions regarding security cooperation. Joint Doctrine Note 1–19 frames security 
cooperation as part of the open-ended “competition continuum” that includes managing 
strategic advantage relative to the adversary based on given resources and policy 
constraints.38 The conceptualization of security cooperation as an infinite effort helps 
explain the challenge of assessment. As an open-ended endeavor, there is no end state to 
measure.  
2. Security Assistance and Cooperation Effects  
A review of the data science literature reveals that different facets of security 
assistance and cooperation yield different and sometimes complementary effects. For 
example, several studies conclude that arms transfers alone do not promote regional 
stability or prevent interstate conflict but more often exacerbate or incite conflict, 
 
36 Andrew H. Kydd, “Game Theory and the Future of International Security,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of International Security, ed. Alexander Gheciu and William C. Wohlforth (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198777854.001.0001.  
37 Antulio Echevarria II, “The Problem of Stability: Military Strategy in a Non-Newtonian Universe,” 
Military Strategy Magazine 7, no. 1 (Spring 2020): 12–16, https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/ 
volume/7/issue/1/. 
38 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Competition Continuum,” Joint Doctrine Note 1–19, (Washington, DC: Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2019), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn1_19.pdf. 
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especially between rival states.39 In one of the most comprehensive empirical studies 
focusing on Middle East regional stability, Childs finds that a 1% increase in material aid 
under the Foreign Military Sales program correlates with a 15% increase in the probability 
of interstate conflict within two years of the sale.40 The adverse effects of arms transfers 
also correlate with increased probability of domestic (intrastate) conflict, including civil 
war and coups.41 However, nonmaterial aid, such as training, and the provisioning of 
defensive weapon systems, reduces the probability of domestic conflict.42 Moreover, in 
the few empirical studies on the subject, U.S. troop deployments significantly reduce the 
probability of interstate conflict but have little or no effect on domestic stability.43  
Additionally, an econometric analysis conducted by RAND finds that U.S. troop presence 
has a “positive, statistically significant effect on U.S. bilateral trade,” concluding that troop 
presence abroad preserves three times more economic benefits than the potential budget 
savings from retrenchment.44 The findings from the quantitative research show that 
security cooperation in the form of arms transfers and training can enhance stability when 
combined with U.S. troop presence, but it cannot replace the regional effect of forward-
39 David Todd Kinsella, “Arms Transfers, Dependence, and Regional Stability: Isolated Effects or 
General Patterns?” (Political Science faculty publications and presentations, Portland State University, Feb 
2019), 10, https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/polisci_fac/10; Peter Rudloff and James Scott, “Buying 
Trouble?”; Gregory S. Sanjian, “Promoting Stability or Instability? Arms Transfers and Regional Rivalries, 
1950–1991,” International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 4 (December 1999): 641–670, https://doi.org/10.1111/ 
0020–8833.00140. 
40 Steven J. Childs, “Granting Security? U.S. Security Assistance Programs and Political Stability in 
the Greater Middle East and Africa,” Journal of the Middle East and Africa 10, no. 2 (April 3, 2019): 157–
82, https://doi.org/10.1080/21520844.2019.1596649. 
41 Arvind Magesan and Eik Swee, “Out of the Ashes, Into the Fire: The Consequences of U.S. 
Weapons Sales for Political Violence,” European Economic Review 107, no. 1 (August 2018): 133–156, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.05.003; Cécile Fauconnet, Julien Malizard & Antoine Pietri, 
“French Arms Exports and Intrastate Conflicts: An Empirical Investigation,” Defense and Peace 
Economics 30, no. 2 (Feb 2019): 176–196, https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2018.1488371. 
42 Michael J. McNerney et al., Assessing Security Cooperation as a Preventive Tool, RR-350-A (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2014), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR350.html; Childs, “Granting 
Security?” For research on the efficacy of provisioning defensive weapon systems see Fauconnet, Malizard 
& Pietri, “French Arms Exports and Intrastate Conflicts.” 
43 Angela O’Mahony et al., U.S. Presence and the Incidence of Conflict, RR-1906-A (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 2018), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1906.html; In Childs, “Granting 
Security?” the data suggests  
44 Daniel Egel et al., Estimating the Value of Overseas Security Commitments, RR-518-AF (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2016), www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR518.html. 
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deployed troops. The strategic rationale for providing arms and training in lieu of U.S. 
troop presence is unsupported. However, proper employment of arms transfers, training, 
and troop deployments can yield favorable outcomes under the right conditions. The 
scholarship suggests that deliberate trade-offs are warranted depending on the resources 
available and the intent of U.S. policy.  
3. Security Assistance and Cooperation Uniformities  
There appear to be only a few uniformities that determine whether security 
cooperation contributes to U.S. policy objectives. Mott IV’s comprehensive treatise on 
military assistance reveals a distinct set of “lawlike regularities” that determine the success 
or failure of any security partnership.45 The literature review supports Mott IV’s assertions 
described in more detail below. Moreover, the uniformities appear to be interrelated in a 
hierarchical structure rather than as separate competing variables.  
The degree of aligned interests is the primary determinant of success in any security 
relationship. Mott IV concludes that across all of his historical case studies in peacetime 
and war, convergent aims remained the dominant predictor of success.46 Likewise, Wilkins 
puts a premium on common interests as the foundation for alliances, coalitions, and 
strategic partnerships.47 In his Congressional testimony, Christopher Paul explains that his 
study of 29 U.S. security partnerships revealed that the alignment of interests is paramount 
to success.48 The scholarship provides strong consensus regarding the importance of 
compatible interests. However, the literature also shows that perfect convergence rarely 
exists in any security partnership, suggesting that aligning interests is a process of 
 
45 William H. Mott IV, United States Military Assistance: An Empirical Perspective (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 2002), ix-x. 
46 Mott IV, An Empirical Perspective, 308. 
47 Thomas S. Wilkins, “‘Alignment’, Not ‘alliance’ – the Shifting Paradigm of International Security 
Cooperation: Toward a Conceptual Taxonomy of Alignment,” Review of International Studies 38, no. 1 
(Jan 2012): 53–76, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41485490. 
48 Examining DOD Security Cooperation: When it Works and When It Doesn’t: Testimony before the 
Full Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 114th Cong. 1 (2015) (statement of 
Christopher Paul, RAND senior social scientist), https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=789068.  
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negotiation. Other factors define and shape the United States’ ability to align interests, 
namely, the degree of U.S. influence, commitment, and policy cohesion. 
A high degree of influence is consistently associated with successful U.S. security 
partnerships. For example, Mara Karlin’s case studies of contemporary U.S. security 
assistance illustrate that the United States requires a controlling influence over the partner 
nation’s most sensitive military affairs to be effective.49 Walter Ladwig’s research on 
counterinsurgencies also emphasizes the importance of control.50 His analysis 
demonstrates that tight (and consistent) conditions on security aid provide the necessary 
leverage for affecting a client’s behavior. Likewise, researchers conclude that the more 
stringent the conditions, the lower the moral hazards to the United States.51 However, Mott 
IV warns that client states can wield significant reverse leverage by choosing or threatening 
to choose alternate suppliers.52 The risk of reverse leverage may explain the United States’ 
policy of “strategic denial” in the Middle East, an effort to limit the extent to which regional 
partners turn to competing suppliers by positioning itself as the provider of choice.53 
Without sufficient influence, the United States cannot negotiate and align interests.  
A high level of U.S. commitment boosts the degree of U.S. influence, reflecting 
another uniformity of successful partnerships. Biddle argues that successful outcomes 
require a significantly large commitment.54 He explains that “small footprints usually 
mean small payoffs.”55 Kinsella views the challenge from an enduring competition 
perspective, arguing that one of the major differences between Cold War and post-Cold 
49 Mara E. Karlin, Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018). 
50 Walter C. Ladwig, The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relationships in Counterinsurgency 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), chap. 3. 
51 Keren Yarhi-Milo, Alexander Lanoszka, and Zack Cooper, “To Arm or to Ally? The Patron’s 
Dilemma and the Strategic Logic of Arms Transfers and Alliances,” International Security 41, no. 2 (Fall 
2016): 90–139, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00250. 
52 Mott IV, An Empirical Perspective, 7–12. 
53 Clayton Thomas et al., Arms Sales in the Middle East, 7–8. 
54 Stephen Biddle, “Building Security Forces & Stabilizing Nations: The Problem of Agency,” 
Daedalus 146, no. 4 (October 2017): 126–38, https://doi.org/10.1162/DAED_a_00464. 
55 Biddle, “The Problem of Agency,” 126. 
12 
War arms transfers was the presumption that major powers were committed to maintaining 
regional security.56 The implication was that the United States would intervene directly in 
a crisis on behalf of the security partner. Kinsella’s research shows that arms transfers 
generally cause regional instability except when major powers are actively committed to 
deterrence.57 Following a similar perspective, the RAND Corporation found that higher 
U.S. commitment, in the form of troops deployed in-country, reduces interstate conflict as 
a form of extended deterrence against an adversary and provides more leverage to restrain 
host country behavior.58 The overall research portrays U.S. commitment as a form of 
signaling to the partner nation. In order for the U.S. to extend deterrence to another country, 
the nature of the commitment must be absolutely credible.59 The scholarship also suggests 
a unique relationship between security assistance and U.S. commitment. Arms transfers 
and advisory missions are no substitute for U.S. presence in maintaining stability unless 
they are tied to a credible commitment to deploy troops if necessary. Notably, without 
credible commitment, U.S. influence diminishes.  
U.S. policy cohesion is the fourth uniformity of successful security assistance and 
cooperation efforts, underpinning the United States’ commitment and influence in security 
partnerships. Mott IV defines cohesion as an integrated effort combining foreign policy, 
military strategy, and economic aid into a unified approach for achieving U.S. aims with 
the partner nation60 His definition implies a synchronized whole-of-government approach 
with a clear and consistent purpose. Derek Reveron provides more emphasis on the State 
Department and Department of Defense, arguing that any security assistance program done 
well includes early national-level coordination between the DOD and DoS using the 
 
56 David Kinsella, “Stability and Instability in Third World Security Complexes: The Role of Arms 
Transfers,” (Political Science faculty publications and presentations, Portland State University, Jan 24, 
2013), https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/polisci_fac/1.  
57 Kinsella, “Role of Arms Transfers,” 27. 
58 Angela O’Mahony et al., U.S. Presence and the Incidence of Conflict, RR-1906-A (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 2018), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1906.html. 
59 Paul K. Huth, “Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War,” American Political Science Review 
82, no. 2 (June 1988): 423–443, https://doi.org/10.2307/1957394. 
60 Mott IV, An Empirical Perspective, 73–76. 
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National Security Strategy as the focal point for synchronization.61 However, U.S. policy 
cohesion may be easier said than done. Matisek describes two policy approaches related to 
security assistance and cooperation, arguing that whole-of-government approaches are 
necessary but rarely come to fruition in the United States.62 He suggests comprehensive 
state-building policies and the more austere containment-type security policies must be 
integrated and resourced adequately for a whole-of-government approach to take effect. 
The overall scholarship emphasizes consistency as a crucial element for success. The 
literature suggests that without consistent, cohesive policy, the United States’ ability to 
signal its commitment to partner states declines, thereby jeopardizing its credibility and 
influence.  
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES
The scholarship on security assistance and cooperation suggests that the profile of
the U.S. security relationship with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates may help 
clarify the efficacy of U.S. contributions towards regional stability in the Persian Gulf. The 
thesis evaluates the following hypothesis:  
H1: The U.S. security partnerships with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 
are dysfunctional. U.S. security assistance and cooperation efforts with the partner nations 
do not conform to the four uniformities associated with successful security partnerships. 
Therefore, the efficacy of U.S. security cooperation contributing towards regional stability 
in the Persian Gulf is low.  
The literature review suggests a hierarchical relationship among the four 
uniformities associated with successful security relationships. The four uniformities 
included the alignment of interests, U.S. influence, commitment to the partner nation’s 
security, and U.S. policy cohesion. The thesis focuses on the relationship itself as the 
primary determinant of policy success. If the U.S. security relationships with Saudi Arabia 
61 Derek Reveron, Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the 
Changing Face of the U.S. Military (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016), 103. 
62Jahara Matisek, “The Crisis of American Military Assistance: Strategic Dithering and Fabergé Egg 
Armies,” Defense and Security Analysis 34, no. 3 (Aug 2018): 267–290, https://doi.org/10/1080/14751798. 
2018.1500757. 
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and the United Arab Emirates do not conform to the profile of successful partnerships, then 
U.S. efficacy is low. Moreover, the relationships are unlikely to produce favorable 
outcomes as intended in U.S. policy, including enhancing regional stability.  
Alternatively, U.S. relationships may conform to the profile of a successful security 
relationship. The confirmation of functional partnerships with Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates serves as the null hypothesis:  
H0: The U.S. security partnerships with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 
are functional. U.S. security assistance and cooperation efforts with the partner nation 
conform to the four uniformities associated with successful security relationships. 
Therefore, the efficacy of U.S. security cooperation in the Gulf is high.  
The hypothesis under investigation addresses whether the profile of the U.S. 
relationships with Gulf partners is functional or dysfunctional. If the null hypothesis proves 
true and U.S. efficacy is high, then the security partnerships are more likely to achieve U.S. 
foreign policy goals as intended, including enhancing regional stability.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN  
The thesis uses a case study to evaluate the U.S. security relationship with Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates from 2000 to 2020. The case study evaluates the four 
uniformities associated with successful security partnerships under three presidential 
administrations. The 2001–2008 Bush administration, the 2009–2016 Obama 
administration, and the 2017–2020 Trump administration. The intent is to focus on U.S. 
policy under each administration’s Conventional Arms Transfer Policy and the security 
assistance and cooperation objectives outlined in the U.S. Foreign Military Training Report 
(FMTR) to Congress. The study operationalizes the four independent variables associated 
with security cooperation success as follows.  
U.S. Policy Cohesion – U.S. policy is evaluated as either cohesive or not cohesive. 
Cohesive policy is absent contradictory policies or strategies working at cross-purposes. 
Cohesiveness requires consistency over time, defined as policies that do not reverse course 
more than once per four-year period. The allowance for change once per four-year period 
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recognizes that U.S. policy may adapt to changing circumstances or new administrations. 
The study primarily relies on the specific objectives published annually by the State 
Department for Saudi Arabia and the United Aran Emirates. However, the study also 
utilizes the Conventional Arms Transfer Policy of the United States and associated national 
strategy documents to identify changes in U.S. policy.  
U.S. Commitment – U.S. commitment is assessed to be either committed or not 
committed. The study determines the level of U.S. commitment to a partner nation’s 
security based on defense agreements and the number of active-duty military personnel 
permanently assigned in-country. A minimum of 200 military personnel serves as the cut-
off for commitment. The study uses 200 as the benchmark to discriminate from U.S. 
Marines assigned to embassies to protect U.S. assets. The study uses the Department of 
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) and secondary sources to determine troop 
presence in-country.  
U.S. Control and Influence – U.S. influence is defined as sufficient or insufficient 
based on the partner nation’s degree of dependency on U.S. armaments. The study 
identifies dependency when the majority (51%) of military equipment is from the United 
States versus alternate suppliers. The assessment uses quantitative data from the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Military Balance, an annual publication 
that lists the military inventory for each country.  
Alignment of Interests – The United States’ and partner nations’ security interests 
are either convergent or divergent. The study uses a two-part process to identify 
convergence. First, convergent interests are predicated on cohesive U.S. policy, U.S. 
commitment, and sufficient U.S. influence. If any of the three variables are absent, then the 
study asserts that U.S. and partner nation interests are divergent, as suggested in the 
literature review. Second, the study evaluates official statements, documents, and 
secondary sources between the United States and the partner nation to identify evidence of 
convergence or divergence. Thus, the convergence of interests focuses specifically on the 
overlap between U.S. and partner nation security policy.  
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Functional Security Partnership – The study defines a functional security 
partnership as a relationship in which U.S. policy is cohesive, the United States is 
committed, retains sufficient influence, and shares convergent security interests with the 
partner nation. 
There are several challenges to the proposed research design. First, the Department 
of Defense classifies the country-level objectives for security cooperation in the 
CENTCOM theater. However, the State Department provides an annual report to Congress 
outlining the foreign policy objectives for all military training, education, and engagement 
activities provided to the partner nation. The research design asserts that the foreign policy 
objectives for conducting military engagements and training with a partner nation are the 
same as for providing military hardware. Secondly, the qualitative assessment regarding 
convergence is vulnerable to subjective interpretation. However, evidence of direct 
divergent interests should be sufficient to overcome any bias in the assessment. 
Additionally, the threshold criteria defining a functional relationship is based on objective 
qualitative and quantitative data measuring four separate variables making the hypothesis 
impossible to prove without multiple sources of evidence. While the degree of alignment 
may be open to interpretation, divergent interests are generally explicit.  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The thesis organizes the project into four chapters. Chapter I introduces the topic 
and highlights the dilemma of security cooperation and assistance in the Gulf. It also 
presents the relevant literature regarding security cooperation and focuses on the 
uniformities associated with successful security cooperation relationships.  
Chapters II and III address the U.S. security relationship with Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates from 2001 to 2019. Each chapter evaluates the relationship during 
three time periods coinciding with different presidential administrations. The analysis 
includes an evaluation of the four uniformities associated with security cooperation 
success. Finally, Chapter IV summarizes the findings of the research project and assesses 
the implications of the study.  
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II. ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S.-SAUDI SECURITY
RELATIONSHIP 
Since the turn of the century, the security relationship between the United States 
and Saudi Arabia has been defined by three U.S. presidents and three Saudi monarchs 
amidst a host of historic regional challenges. With President George W. Bush, King Fahd 
(1982-2005), and then his successor, King Abdullah (2005-2015), the two countries 
weathered the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq. President Barack Obama and King Abdullah, followed by his successor, King Salman 
(2015-present), witnessed the collapse of the regional order in the wake of the Arab Spring 
as regimes toppled in Egypt and Tunisia, and new wars erupted in Syria, Libya, Iraq, and 
Yemen. President Trump and King Salman faced the instability of the ongoing wars along 
with an increasingly aggressive Iran and a resurgent Russia. The following analysis 
evaluates the elements of continuity and change in the U.S.-Saudi relationship to discern 
whether the security partnership has remained functional given the trying circumstances of 
the past twenty years.  
A. U.S.-SAUDI SECURITY RELATIONSHIP 2001–2008 
The U.S.-Saudi relationship from 2001 to 2008 reflected a series of severe strains 
catalyzed by the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. By 1996, 
U.S.-Saudi relations reached their lowest point than at any previous time in history.63 U.S.
regional policy at the time focused on containing Iraq and Iran using the force structure
deployed to fight the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War.64 The heavy U.S. commitment of
forward-deployed forces in Saudi Arabia deterred further interstate conflict but also
motivated extremist violence against Saudi Arabia and the United States leading up to the
63 Rachel Bzostek and Samuel Robison, “U.S. Policy toward Israel, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia: An 
Integrated Analysis, 1981–2004,” International Studies Perspectives 9, no. 4 (2008): 359–376, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1528-3585.2008.00342.x. 
64 Joshua Rovner and Caitlin Talmadge, “Hegemony, Force Posture, and the Provision of Public 
Goods: The Once and Future Role of Outside Powers in Securing Persian Gulf Oil,” Security Studies 23, 
no. 3 (August 2014): 548–581, https://doi.org/10.1080/15325024.2014.935224. 
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attacks of September 11, 2001.65 The resulting global war on terrorism became a source 
of fear, hostility, and domestic instability in Saudi Arabia, further straining U.S.-Saudi 
relations.66 Likewise, criticism against the Kingdom from Congress and the U.S. media 
increased in light of revelations that Saudi nationals were responsible for the 9/11 attacks.67 
The 2003 Iraq War further exacerbated tensions between the two countries. The collapse 
of the Sunni Baathist regime in Iraq made Saudi Arabia more vulnerable to Iranian 
aspirations.68 By 2008, Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal described U.S.-Saudi 
relations as a “train wreck.”69 Despite the ongoing cooperation in the war on terrorism, 
relations remained severely strained in 2008.  
During the Bush presidency, U.S. security cooperation policy in Saudi Arabia was 
not cohesive until after 2004. From 2000 to 2004, U.S. objectives emphasized maintaining 
access to Saudi territory and promoting cooperation and interoperability with the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC).70 However, there were changes each year with alternating 
emphases: enabling the Kingdom to take more responsibility for regional defense (2000), 
providing support to Operation SOUTHERN WATCH (2001), supporting military action 
against Iraq (2002), supporting the war on terrorism (2003), and exposing the kingdom to 
international norms and U.S. values (2003).71 By 2005, the U.S. objectives for Saudi 
Arabia remained focused on the war on terrorism, exposing Saudis to U.S. values and 
international norms, and enabling the Kingdom to assume greater responsibility for self-
 
65 Rovner and Talmadge, “Securing Persian Gulf Oil,” 572–573. 
66 David E. Long, “US-Saudi Arabia Diplomatic Relations: An Evolutionary Process,” in Handbook 
of US-Middle East Relations: Formative Factors and Regional Perspectives, ed. Robert E. Looney (New 
York: Routledge, 2014), 414–415. 
67 David Ottaway, “The King and Us: U.S.-Saudi Relations in the Wake of 9/11,” Foreign Affairs 88, 
no.3 (May/June 2009): 121–31, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2009-05-01/king-and-us. 
68 Henner Fürtig, “Conflict and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf: The Interregional Order and U.S. 
Policy,” Middle East Journal 61, no. 4 (Autumn 2007): 627–640, https://doi.org/10.3751/61.4.13. 
69 Bruce O. Riedel, Kings and Presidents: Saudi Arabia and the United States Since FDR 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2018), 152.  
70 Department of State, “Foreign Military Training and DOD Engagement Activities of Interest,” 
(Saudi Arabia, 2000–2004).  
71 Department of State, “Foreign Military Training and DOD Engagement Activities of Interest,” 
(Saudi Arabia, 2000–2003). 
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defense.72 Overall, U.S. security policy for Saudi Arabia was not cohesive until after 2004, 
although relations remained severely strained throughout the period. 
U.S. troop presence in Saudi Arabia fluctuated considerably from 2001 to 2008, 
indicating a significant shift in U.S. commitment to regional security. From 1997 to 2002, 
the number of U.S. troops in-country gravitated towards a steady state of approximately 
5,000 personnel. However, during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Department of Defense 
records show an official peak of 12,218 active-duty members permanently stationed in 
Saudi Arabia, followed by a radical drop to 235 personnel by September 2004.73 After 
2004, steady-state troop counts declined 90% and remained at 300 to 500 personnel 
throughout the Bush presidency reflecting a new minimum level of commitment to Saudi 
Arabia’s defense.74 The reason behind the dramatic reduction stems from the strained 
relations caused by Saudi objections to U.S. offensive operations launched from Prince 
Sultan Air Base, the most capable airbase in the region at that time.75 The result was a 
recharacterization of the U.S.-Saudi relationship and a permanent transition of U.S. forces 
to Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar starting in 2003.76 After the marked change in the U.S-Saudi 
relationship, the U.S. remained minimally committed throughout the Bush presidency.  
U.S. influence in Saudi Arabia remained strong from 2001 to 2008, but the 
Kingdom actively diversified its weapons portfolio away from U.S. manufacturers to 
72 Department of State, “Foreign Military Training and DOD Engagement Activities of Interest,” 
(Saudi Arabia, 2004–2008). 
73 Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) (Total Military, Civilian, and Dependent Strengths by 
Regional Area and by Country; accessed June 15, 2021), https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-data-
reports/workforce-reports.  
74 Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) (Total Military, Civilian, and Dependent Strengths by 
Regional Area and by Country; accessed June 15, 2021), https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-data-
reports/workforce-reports. 
75 Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operations Enduring 
Freedom, MG-166-1-CENTAF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), https://www.rand.org/pubs/ 
monographs/MG166-1.html; “US Pulls out of Saudi Arabia,” BBC, April 29, 2003, http://news.bbc.co. 
uk/2/hi/middle_east/2984547.stm; Jim Sciutto, “U.S. Troops Preparing for War in Qatar,”ABC, January 7, 
2006, https://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=130093&page=1. 
76 Michael R. Gordon and Eric Schmitt, “Aftereffects: Bases; U.S. will Move Air Operations to Qatar 
Base,” New York Times, April 28, 2003, https://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/28/world/aftereffects-bases-us-
will-move-air-operations-to-qatar-base.html; Rebecca Grant, “The Short, Strange Life of PSAB,” Air Force 
Magazine, July 1, 2012, https://www.airforcemag.com/article/0712psab/.  
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increase its independence. In 2001, roughly two-thirds of Saudi weapon systems originated 
from the United States, all of which required U.S. logistics and technical support.77 
Although resentful of U.S. coercive leverage, the ruling family met nearly every demand 
made by the administration leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.78 However, after the 
conventional phase of the war (March-April 2003), the U.S.-Saudi security relationship 
changed significantly. In 2005–2006, arms transfers to Saudi Arabia reoriented towards 
preserving the ruling family’s security, specifically through modernization of the 
Kingdom’s National Guard.79 U.S. arms transfers negotiated in 2005 and 2006 included 
$1B of riot control vehicles, armored personnel carriers, water cannons, ammunition, and 
assorted equipment for ensuring internal security.80 Second, King Abdullah pursued large 
contracts with European countries to modernize Saudi Arabia’s Air Force and Navy. The 
European arms deals in 2005 and 2006 included 72 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft and two 
defense deals with France to acquire French submarines, tanks, and combat aircraft.81 
Thus, while U.S. influence over Saudi Arabia was strong leading up to the 2003 invasion 
of Iraq, post-war relations witnessed the ruling family’s efforts to diversify its inventory 
and mitigate its complete dependence on U.S. military support. 
The 2003 shift in U.S.-Saudi relations reflected a growing divergence between the 
two countries’ regional policy goals, although evidence suggests the relationship remained 
minimally functional. Although Saudi Arabia provided essential support enabling the 
United States to defeat Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath regime in Iraq, the assistance was 
predicated on Saudi Arabia’s complete dependence on the United States for its future 
security.82 The Saudi royal family officially announced their objections to a U.S.-led war 
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in Iraq in a televised statement days before the U.S. invasion.83 In addition, senior Saudi 
officials suggested to the press that the United States had overstayed its welcome at Prince 
Sultan Air Base, leading some to conclude that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia had different 
priorities for the region.84 By 2004, the two countries had redefined their relationship, and 
the United States began its permanent relocation from Prince Sultan Air Base to Al Udeid 
Air Base in Qatar. Despite the dramatic change, two factors suggest the security 
relationship remained minimally functional. First, a small contingent of U.S. personnel 
remained to stay and train Saudi military forces.85 Second, the Kingdom continued to 
pursue significant defense contracts with the United States, albeit with a new focus on 
internal regime security.86 By the end of the 2001–2008 period, the relationship was 
redefined by minimally converging interests to defend the Al-Saud regime from threats 
within the Kingdom.  
B. U.S.-SAUDI SECURITY RELATIONSHIP 2009–2016 
The U.S.-Saudi relationship from 2009 to 2016 changed from minimal coordination 
to policy friction as the U.S. sought to reduce its commitment to the Middle East. In the 
early years of the Obama presidency, the unanticipated continuation of the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan led Washington to question the United States’ heavy investment in the Middle 
East and seek a transition towards the Asia-Pacific.87 The United States’ initial policy 
position in the Middle East was active disengagement.88 However, the Arab Spring (2010-
83 “Saudi Arabia Rejects Participation in War Against Iraq,” CNN, March 18, 2003, http://www.cnn. 
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2012), the rise of the Islamic State (2013-2014), and widespread political turmoil 
challenged the regional order and redefined the United States’ role in the region.89 Fawaz 
Gerges argues that U.S. policy in the Middle East during this period reflected high 
aspirational goals for self-directed transformation in the Middle East.90 He notes that the 
Oval Office challenged the notion that the status quo, defined as U.S. support to autocratic 
regimes, was in the United States’ best interests in the long term. Instead, the new approach 
put a premium on popular political movements, which required the United States to avoid 
backing autocratic leaders. The result was policy friction between the United States and 
the long-supported autocratic leaders who could no longer rely on the United States for 
their regimes’ security. 
U.S. security objectives in Saudi Arabia were somewhat fungible albeit nominally 
cohesive from 2009 to 2016 period. In 2009, policy objectives continued to emphasize 
Saudi Arabia’s important role in the war against terrorism.91 However, in 2010, the U.S. 
policy objectives changed dramatically and emphasized the need for Saudi Arabia to 
manage its own defense.92 By 2012, foreign policy objectives in the Persian Gulf were 
standardized across all of the Gulf countries. Notably, the U.S. published the same security 
cooperation objectives for both Iran and Saudi Arabia: to enhance “strategic bilateral and 
regional relations.”93 This was also the first time in decades that the United States provided 
security assistance (albeit minimal) to Iran to attend select regional security conferences.94 
The new policies reflected a desire for the United States to transfer the burden of managing 
security to the regional actors, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states. After 2012, U.S. 
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security objectives for Saudi Arabia remained relatively unchanged and continued to 
emphasize the Kingdom’s responsibility to resolve and prevent regional conflicts.  
Paradoxically, the United States’ efforts to transfer the burden of security included 
an increase in the number of U.S. troops stationed in Saudi Arabia to support an expanding 
train and advise mission. The United States continued to station a small force of military 
personnel as part of the Saudi-funded U.S. Military Training Mission (USMTM) and the 
U.S. Office of the Program Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard (PM-SANG).95 
Additionally, the United States invented a new policy mechanism called a technical 
cooperation agreement (TCA) to extend military support to the Saudi Ministry of the 
Interior.96 The additional TCA missions constituted the only programs in the world that 
allow the U.S. military to train a country’s interior security forces.97 The new missions 
increased troop levels from 2013 to 2015, peaking at 654 active-duty personnel.98 In 2015, 
the United States also provided military intelligence and logistical support to Saudi Arabia 
to defend the Kingdom from Houthi violence.99 Although the Obama administration 
emphasized transferring the burden of security to regional actors, the United States 
increased its commitment to the Kingdom’s defense through a series of Saudi-financed 
technical agreements, service contracts, and direct U.S. military support for the war in 
Yemen.  
Despite contradictory policies and strained relations, U.S.-Saudi military ties 
expanded from 2009 to 2016 through several high-profile arms deals. During this period, 
Saudi Arabia continued to diversify its defense portfolio by acquiring field artillery systems 
from China (PLZ-45), mine-resistant infantry patrol vehicles from France (Aravis), and 
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tanker transports from Europe (A330 MRTT).100 However, in a personal meeting with 
King Abdullah in March 2010, Secretary Gates negotiated what was then the largest U.S. 
arms deal in history.101 The deal comprised a lifetime value of $60 billion in major 
conventional weapon systems. It included an extensive provision of advanced munitions 
and significant upgrades to the Saudi National Guard, Royal Saudi Land Forces, and Royal 
Saudi Air Force.102 The United States also completed dozens of new arms transfers during 
this period, including AH-64E Apache combat helicopters, upgraded tanks and munitions, 
specially configured King Air-350 surveillance aircraft, AGM-114L HELLFIRE missiles, 
and over 10,000 laser and GPS-guided precision bombs.103 By 2015, fast-tracking arms 
deliveries became the centerpiece of U.S. policy as a means to reassure Gulf partners.104 
As a result, the percentage of U.S. weaponry in the Saudi arsenal continued to increase, 
creating enduring U.S. dependencies in the Saudi National Guard and the military services. 
The U.S.-Saudi security relationship from 2009 to 2016 reflected minimally 
compatible interests punctuated by acute discord and competing priorities. Multiple media 
outlets reported senior Saudi official calls for the Kingdom to distance itself from the 
United States due to divergent policies regarding Iran’s regional role, the political 
aftermath of the Arab Spring, and the Syrian civil war.105 Notably, Saudi Arabia rejected 
the rotating seat of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to protest U.S. policies in 
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the region.106 Additionally, Prince Turki Al-Faisal, royal family insider and former Saudi 
Ambassador to the United States, suggested that the Kingdom was no longer allied with 
the White House administration but would remain loyal to the American people based on 
historical ties and shared interests.107 However, the Brooking Institution’s leading expert 
on U.S.- Saudi relations, Bruce Riedel, notes that both the United States and Saudi Arabia 
compromised on key issues to preserve the strained relationship.108 According to Riedel, 
Washington softened its position on Egypt and Bahrain during the Arab Spring upheavals 
to appease King Abdullah. Likewise, King Salman remained silent on the United States 
lifting sanctions against Iran in exchange for U.S. support to the war in Yemen.109 The 
evidence suggests that U.S.-Saudi interests were nominally compatible during this time 
period and strongly influenced by a strictly transactional relationship predicated on U.S. 
intent to reduce its role in the region.  
C. U.S.-SAUDI SECURITY RELATIONSHIP 2017–2020
The U.S.-Saudi relationship from 2017 to 2020 experienced a qualified revival
during the Trump presidency centered on containing Iranian adventurism and optimizing 
economic benefits. The period was marked by unprecedented Saudi foreign policy 
activism, evidenced by the Kingdom’s kidnapping of the Lebanese prime minister, its 
ongoing war of choice in Yemen, and its initiated crisis with Qatar.110 U.S. foreign policy 
also experienced a radical shift by redefining the purpose of arms transfers as a tool of 
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economic security.111 For the first time, the United States government committed to 
promoting the U.S. arms industry abroad by reducing the regulatory environment and 
maximizing the financial benefits of the global conventional arms market.112 In 2019, 
responding to concerns from Congress, the State Department’s Inspector General 
addressed the potentially destabilizing effects of  expedited arms transfers to Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates but concluded that all arms transfers, to include “emergency 
sales” absent Congressional oversight, complied with the Arms Export Control Act.113 
The report cited 4,221 arms transfers to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates from 
January 2017 to August 2020, all of which were under the legal threshold for notifying 
Congress.114 In addition to the unprecedented support to Saudi Arabia through arms deals, 
the United States also deployed two fighter squadrons to protect the Kingdom from Iranian 
aggression in the wake of missile and drone attacks on oil and natural gas facilities in Saudi 
Arabia.115 The deployments served as a clear departure from previous U.S. policy 
emphasizing the need for partner nations to defend themselves. The new U.S. policy 
reprioritized the relationship with Saudi Arabia as a means to advance U.S. prosperity.  
The U.S. security cooperation policy in Saudi Arabia from 2017 to 2020 was 
relatively cohesive, albeit controversial due to repeated challenges by Congress. The 
explicit security objectives remained unchanged since 2012 and focused on three lines of 
effort: maintaining relations, professionalizing the Saudi military, and improving 
interoperability with U.S. and aligned forces.116 A key priority outlined in the 2017 
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National Security Strategy (NSS) included facilitating the export of U.S. military 
equipment abroad to strengthen U.S. competitiveness.117 The 2017 NSS matched the 
United States’ new conventional arms transfer policy emphasizing the economic benefits 
of selling armaments.118 However, debates continued in the 115th and 116th Congress 
regarding arms sales to Saudi Arabia and concerns over the Kingdom’s conduct in Yemen, 
leading to several attempts to curb U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition.119 In 2019, 
Congress submitted a joint resolution to end all U.S. involvement in Yemen except 
counterterrorism operations, but it failed to pass a presidential veto.120 The Trump 
administration also invoked emergency authorities in May 2019 to proceed with arms sales 
to Saudi Arabia that were opposed by Congress.121 Congress attempted to stop the arms 
transfers and passed three bills that were all vetoed in July 2019, and a subsequent Senate 
vote failed to overcome the veto.122 Except for the controversy in Congress, U.S. arms 
transfers to Saudi Arabia continued unabated. 
During the period 2017 to 2020, the United States also increased its defense 
guarantees to Saudi Arabia. In addition to record numbers of arms transfers, the United 
States deployed an expeditionary air wing, two fighter squadrons, and U.S. radar and 
missile systems constituting about 3,000 military personnel to Saudi Arabia.123 In 
President Trump’s official notification to Congress dated November 20, 2019, the 
communication cited Iran’s attacks against Saudi oil and gas facilities a month prior as the 
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catalyst for the deployment. As part of the deployment, the U.S. Navy positioned the USS 
Nitze, an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, off the coast of Saudi Arabia to fend off any 
follow-on missile attacks from Iran.124 Contrary to previous policy, the United States no 
longer focused on reducing U.S. forces in the Middle East. Instead, it put into practice a 
form of extended deterrence not seen since the Cold War.  
Saudi Arabia’s dependence on U.S. arms and support continued throughout the 
2017–2020 period, but some signs of reverse leverage challenged U.S. influence. In 
October 2017, during the historic first visit of the Saudi monarchy to Russia, King Salman 
signed a memorandum of understanding with Russia, including the purchase of the S-400 
air defense system.125 That same month, the Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) 
also announced new arms transfers, including Kornet anti-tank guided missiles and TOS-
1A advanced multiple rocket launchers and education and training contracts to sustain 
Russo-Saudi military development in the Kingdom.126 At the height of Congressional 
opposition to U.S. arms transfers to Saudi Arabia in 2020, SAMI signaled to U.S. audiences 
that it could acquire equivalent weapons systems or products through any number of 
foreign partnerships.127 Nevertheless, significant U.S. deliveries continued to arrive in 
Saudi Arabia, including M-1A2S Abrams tanks, modernized PAC-3 Patriot air defense 
systems, and advanced F-15SA fighter aircraft.128 Notably, the day after King Salman’s 
historic meeting in Russia and the Saudi-Russo arms deal announcement, the U.S. Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announced the sale of the Terminal High-Altitude 
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Air Defense (THAAD) system to Saudi Arabia under a new $15 billion contract.129 The 
timing of the DSCA notification and the S-400 notification one day apart suggests Saudi 
Arabia used the S-400 announcement as leverage. However, Saudi Arabia continued to 
field predominantly U.S. equipment even as the ruling family tried to diversify across 
multiple foreign partners. 
U.S. and Saudi interests remained minimally compatible from 2017 to 2020, 
although Congressional support waned considerably. Despite multiple attempts to curb 
arms sales to Saudi Arabia, Congress was unable to overcome presidential vetoes or the 
emergency powers granted by the 1976 Armed Export Control Act. Additionally, the U.S. 
reversal on the Iran issue, as evidenced by the controversial withdrawal from the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), suggests that the United States favored powers 
like Saudi Arabia over traditional solidarity with European allies.130 However, multiple 
human rights violations against political activists, culminating in killing and 
dismemberment of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, alienated key Saudi supporters in the 
United States.131 Additionally, the oil price war between Russia and Saudi Arabia created 
a new challenge for the U.S. economy. As a result, the United States threatened to withdraw 
all military support from Saudi Arabia if it did not resolve the conflict with Moscow and 
cut oil production.132 Nevertheless, the fact that Saudi Arabia complied with U.S. demands 
suggests that national priorities remained convergent through the intersection of each 
nations’ economic interests and position on Iran.  
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The U.S.-Saudi security partnership from 2001 to 2020 remained nominally 
functional despite several controversial episodes that threatened to end the relationship. 
U.S. policy, while dynamic in light of unprecedented regional turmoil and vastly different 
policy approaches in the White House and Riyadh, was also relatively cohesive as 
articulated in relevant U.S. official reports and documents. The U.S. also remained 
committed, albeit minimally at times, with no less than 235 U.S. active-duty personnel 
stationed in the Kingdom throughout the 20 years. Equally important, Saudi dependency 
on U.S. military support remained constant, which provided sufficient U.S. influence to 
negotiate aligned interests. Even when U.S. and Saudi priorities and values were not 
convergent, interests remained compatible, as evidenced by significant episodes of 
compromise by both parties. However, the assessment found that the decisions of each 
nation’s elite leaders defined the character of the security relationship. More often than not, 
arms transfers were a presidential tool of political expediency that rarely appeared to be 
part of a deliberate vision or strategy to improve regional stability. Nevertheless, the U.S.-
Saudi security relationship demonstrated remarkable resilience under the most trying 
conditions rendering it nominally functional for most of the twenty-year period.  
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III. ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S.-UAE SECURITY
RELATIONSHIP 
The security relationship between the United States and the United Arab Emirates 
has primarily been defined by the Emirates’ strategic vision and meteoric rise as a small 
nation. Despite its size,133 the UAE is home to the seventh-largest proven oil reserves 
globally (more than Russia) and commands more sovereign wealth than Saudi Arabia.134 
The UAE’s extraordinary resources have given it outsized influence and ambitions to 
become a regional power with international reach.135 During its ascendancy onto the 
international stage (buoyed by a surge in oil prices from 2002 to 2008), the UAE began to 
craft and diversify new security relationships beyond its 1994 Defense Cooperation 
Agreement with the United States.136 In addition to its diversification strategy, the UAE 
also enacted an aggressive soft power campaign to enhance its security relationships with 
countries like the United States.137 Although the United States has never designated the 
United Arab Emirates as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) as it has Kuwait and Bahrain, 
the UAE’s carefully stage-managed image presented to Washington has enamored foreign 
and military policy elites and cultivated a reputation as a capable ally above its Arab peers 
in the Middle East.138  
133 According to the CIA World Factbook, the UAE is about 4% the size of Saudi Arabia in terms of 
territory, and a third in size in terms of population. However, in terms of citizenship, there are just over 1.1 
million Emiratis compared to 21.5 million Saudis living in their respective countries. “CIA World Fact 
Book,” updated July 8, 2021, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/. 
134 Christopher M Davidson, From Sheikhs to Sultanism: Statecraft and Authority in Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), 3–4. 
135 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Small States with a Big Role: Qatar and the United Arab Emirates in 
the Wake of the Arab Spring” (discussion paper, Durham University, 2012), https://dro.dur.ac.uk/10011/1/ 
10011.pdf. 
136 Kristian Ulrichsen, The United Arab Emirates: Power, Politics and Policymaking, (New York: 
Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2017), 185.  
137 See notes from Davidson on UAE’s ‘Soft Power Council,’ Davidson, From Sheiks to Sultanism, 1 
& 276, note 4.  
138 Albadr AbuBaker Alshateri, “How Washington Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the UAE,” 
American Diplomacy (Feb 2020), https://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2020/02/how-washington-
learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-the-uae/. 
32 
A. U.S.-UAE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP 2001–2008  
From 2001 to 2008, the U.S.-UAE security relationship started to take shape despite 
the challenges of the U.S. war on terrorism. In 2002, Secretary Colin Powell and Sheikh 
Hamdan bin Zayed established the U.S.-UAE Strategic Partnership to expand bilateral 
cooperation.139 In an additional act of support, the UAE military deployed in 2003 beside 
U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan.140 By 2006, the UAE developed a reputation for 
hosting more U.S. naval ship visits than any other non-U.S. port in the world.141 The 
growing relationship culminated in 2008 with the first visit to the United Arab Emirates by 
a sitting U.S. president and the formulation of the U.S.-Gulf Security Dialogue to isolate a 
strengthening Iran.142 However, not all developments were positive during this period. 
W.A. Terrill notes that UAE’s ties to the Taliban and the participation of two Emirati 
citizens in the 9/11 hijackings negatively impacted U.S.-UAE relations. Additionally, the 
Dubai Ports World (DPW) controversy in 2006 became a highly publicized national 
security issue when a UAE company attempted to purchase port management of six major 
U.S. seaports. Congress blocked the deal, but the prevailing message was that the United 
States would always treat Arab allies with suspicion.143 This may explain why the UAE 
continued to pursue alternate security agreements with France, including the establishment 
of the first permanent French base in the Persian Gulf.144 Nevertheless, the UAE started  
to assert itself as an important U.S. security partner in the Persian Gulf from 2001 to 2008.   
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Despite growing ties, the U.S. security policy in the United Arab Emirates was 
extremely limited in scope from 2001 to 2008. The State Department’s annual reports to 
Congress emphasized the same foreign policy objectives for nearly eight years: provide 
military education, training, and technology to improve interoperability with U.S. 
forces.145 For a brief two-year period starting in 2008, the annual objectives included 
exposing the Emirati military to U.S. values and increasing awareness of international 
norms and human rights.146 Otherwise, military interoperability remained the sole focus.  
U.S. commitment to the Emirates’ defense grew substantially from 2001 to 2008. 
Department of Defense records indicate a low of twenty-one military personnel assigned 
to the UAE in September 2002, expanding to 1,555 personnel assigned by September 
2008.147 Another indicator of the United States’ growing commitment to UAE’s security 
was a bilateral agreement signed with the UAE in February 2006 establishing the Gulf Air 
Warfare Center at Al Dhafra Air Base.148 The Air Warfare Center was established to 
improve pilot proficiency in the Persian Gulf and eventually extended Air and Air Defense 
training to all GCC member states. By the end of 2008, the U.S. commitment to the UAE 
was at a historic high.  
From 2001 to 2008, the UAE held an increasingly prominent position in U.S. 
security policy, but the Emirates remained independent of U.S. control due to its extensive 
inventory provided by the French. In 2001, most of the major weapon systems in the UAE 
originated from France, with lesser contributions from the UK and Russia. At the turn of 
the century, the Emirati military inventory consisted of French Mirage 2000 aircraft and 
Leclerc main battle tanks, Russian BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, and British Scorpion 
reconnaissance vehicles.149 The only U.S. equipment in inventory included AH-64A 
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Apache attack helicopters, M109A3 self-propelled howitzers, and I-HAWK surface-to-air 
missile batteries.150 U.S. weapon systems represented a fraction of the Emirati inventory 
until 2004 when the first of 80 F-16 Block 60 “Desert Falcons” arrived.151 The UAE 
invested $2-3 billion in research and development costs for the Desert Falcon aircraft. The 
sale marked the first time the United States exported a better aircraft than it had in its own 
inventory.152 By 2008, U.S. aircraft constituted nearly half of the Emirati Air Force 
inventory, but France remained the provider of choice for most of UAE’s military arsenal. 
U.S. and UAE security interests remained aligned from 2001 to 2008, even during 
the turmoil leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Despite strong domestic opposition to 
the war, including mass protests in Dubai, UAE provided the United States with overflight 
rights and refrained from public criticism of the United States.153 During a press 
conference in Abu Dhabi in January 2005, the assistant secretary of defense, Peter Rodman, 
announced the formation of the U.S.-UAE Joint Military Commission to formalize military 
ties and highlighted the UAE’s “good, quiet cooperation” with the United States.154 The 
UAE also openly supported the US-backed provisional government in Iraq by contributing 
$215 million in reconstruction assistance.155 Yet for all of the public cooperation, there 
were also several areas of conflict, including the UAE’s record on illicit transfers of nuclear 
technology, human rights abuses, human trafficking, and disagreements on U.S. calls for 
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political reform.156 The main area of U.S.-UAE convergence during this period revolved 
around deterring Iran.157 Both countries actively sought to isolate Iran’s growing regional 
ambitions. Because of the commonly perceived threat posed by Iran, U.S.-UAE interests 
remained compatible during this period.  
B. U.S.-UAE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP 2009–2016 
The U.S.-UAE security relationship experienced significant challenges from 2009 
to 2016, highlighting the UAE’s increasing capability and independence from the United 
States. The U.S. policy of Middle East retrenchment coupled with the threat posed by the 
Arab Spring propelled the UAE’s assertive regional security strategy.158 The new strategy, 
in development since the 2004 death of UAE’s founding father, Zayed bin Sultan Al-
Nahyan, emphasized inculcating a positive image in Washington to nurture closer ties 
without becoming reliant on the United States.159 The UAE’s proactive strategy fulfilled 
Washington’s desire for Gulf nations to share the burden of regional security but also 
reduced Washington’s influence on UAE decision-making.160 Nevertheless, despite 
multiple policy disagreements described in more detail below, the UAE’s reputation as a 
capable and reliable military partner continued to grow. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Martin 
Dempsey, described the UAE as the United States’ most credible and capable ally.161 The 
Secretary of Defense, Ash Carter, stated that the UAE “unquestionably has one of the most 
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capable militaries in the Middle East, and a truly excellent bilateral relationship with us 
that’s growing stronger and more institutionalized every day.”162 And former U.S. 
CENTCOM Commander, Anthony Zinni, called the UAE partnership “the strongest 
relationship that the United States has in the Arab world today.”163 In large part due to 
UAE’s influence campaign in Washington, by 2016, the UAE emerged as the United 
States’ partner of choice in the Middle East.  
From 2009 to 2016, U.S. policy objectives for the UAE remained cohesive, albeit 
limited in scope. In 2010 and 2011, the State Department published identical foreign policy 
objectives for the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait, stressing interoperability with 
U.S. forces and developing host nation expertise for Gulf countries to manage their own 
defense.164 In 2012, the U.S. prioritized “military professionalization” and 
“interoperability with U.S. and coalition forces” as its foreign policy objectives for UAE 
and most of the Gulf monarchies.”165 Reflecting a renewed emphasis on burden sharing, 
the U.S. Security Sector Assistance policy published in 2013 outlined the U.S. intent “to 
help allies and partner nations build their own security capacity.”166 In addition to burden 
sharing, U.S. policy also stressed expediting arms transfers as a centerpiece of security 
cooperation. For example, the new Conventional Arms Transfer Policy published in 2014 
emphasized streamlining security cooperation and the conventional arms transfer process 
and taking “all available steps to hasten” arms transfers and security assistance.167 The 
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policy updates reflected the U.S. intent outlined in the 2010 National Security Strategy to 
pivot away from the Middle East.168 While U.S. policy objectives for security cooperation 
with the UAE were cohesive, they were also generically applied across all Gulf countries, 
signaling a deliberate effort to disengage from the region. 
From 2009 to 2016, despite U.S. efforts to disengage from the Persian Gulf, the 
United States ended up increasing its security commitments to the United Arab Emirates 
through a series of troop assignments and high-profile defense agreements. According to 
DOD records, from 2009 to 2016, the United States increased its steady-state troop 
presence to an average of 2,000 active-duty personnel stationed in the UAE, with a peak 
of 4,021 personnel assigned in March 2014.169 Additionally, starting in 2012, the United 
States expanded its presence at Al Dhafra Air Base by stationing Global Hawk UAVs, 
AWACS, F-15 Eagles, and F-22 Raptors.170 Also, in 2012, the U.S. Army deployed the 
Patriot Security Assistance team as part of a long-term defense contract to advise UAE 
personnel on the maintenance and tactical employment of the Patriot missile defense 
system.171 Furthermore, the U.S. Marine Corps established a military training mission to 
train the Emirates’ new Presidential Guard under a separate agreement.172 The high-profile 
defense contracts culminated in 2015 and 2016 when the UAE became the first foreign 
nation to purchase and employ the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System 
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(THAAD).173 The THAAD contract included a dedicated security assistance team to train 
and advise UAE personnel in-country.174 Thus, despite U.S. emphasis on transferring 
more of the security burden to Gulf partners, the number of U.S. military personnel 
stationed in the UAE increased significantly.  
Between 2009 and 2016, the Emirates’ strategy of diversifying across multiple arms 
suppliers ensured the UAE remained independent of U.S. controlling influence. Soubrier 
assesses that this is part of an emerging shift in Gulf nations’ security strategy, particularly 
the UAE, to gain leverage with exporting countries and deprive supplier states of any undue 
interference in their foreign policies.175 The UAE’s approach is evident from the long list 
of defense agreements signed in 2015 and 2016 with Canada, Georgia, Italy, Finland, 
Poland, Sweden, Germany, and Indonesia.176 Although the percentage of U.S.-sourced 
equipment in the UAE increased after High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) 
and C-17 Globemaster deliveries, the arms transfers were matched by alternate suppliers 
to include Russian BMP-3s and Swedish Saab 340 Erieye airborne early warning and 
control aircraft.177 The UAE’s stringent offset requirements also ensured that any arms 
deal over $10M required the company to compensate the host nation as a condition of the 
sale—generally in the form of a joint venture with UAE as the 51% shareholder.178 Thus, 
the UAE security strategy obfuscates which country exerts influence on whom and 
suggests that the UAE postures itself to exercise significant reverse leverage.  
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U.S.-UAE interests were relatively compatible from 2009 to 2016, but divergent
policies in the wake of the Arab Spring threatened the relationship. For example, the White 
House’s calls for Hosni Mubarak to step down in 2011 appalled royal elites in Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates and signaled a dramatic turn in the United States’ historical 
support for the region’s autocratic allies.179 The event led Crown Prince Mohammed bin 
Zayed (MBZ) to warn President Obama that supporting the demands of Arab Spring 
activists could spell the end of the U.S. relationship.180 The crux of the divergent interests 
rested on the UAE’s view that any Islamist movement, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, 
represents an existential threat.181 The UAE’s hardline anti-Islamist stance contradicted 
the United States’ Middle East retrenchment policy and drove the Emirates to take steps to 
shape the region in their favor. Examples include the 2014 airstrikes against Islamists in 
Libya,182 the controversial transfer of U.S.-sourced weapons to proxies in Yemen,183 the 
2014 Qatar crisis,184 and proxy rivalries inflaming the Syrian conflict.185 Although 
perceptions of waning U.S. commitment to the region damaged U.S.-UAE ties, the 
relationship improved once the two countries realigned to combat the Islamic State in 
Syria.186 As a symbol of their aligned interests, the United States authorized the UAE to 
command airstrikes in Syria, the only Arab country authorized to direct strikes in the 
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theater.187 Notably, the UAE conducted more airstrikes in Syria than any other coalition 
member, second only to the United States.188 The renewed partnership culminated in the 
launch of the Sawab Center, a joint U.S.-UAE endeavor to counter extremist 
propaganda.189 U.S.-UAE interests converged once the United States was actively 
engaged in countering Islamist movements.  
C. U.S.-UAE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP 2017–2020 
The U.S.-UAE relationship, buoyed by extensive defense contracts and 
agreements, increased significantly from 2017 to 2020. However, in contrast to previous 
administrations, the U.S. policy of principled realism deemphasized American ideology in 
favor of countering regional threats, namely Iran and Islamist extremism, by making “allies 
with anyone that shares our goals.”190 As a result, scholars disagree on whether the Trump 
administration’s policies contributed towards a decline or improvement in regional 
stability. For example, Mehran Kamrava argues that the Qatar rift in 2017 served as an 
indicator that the U.S. policy, marked by a massive influx of new weaponry and regional 
activism, deepened the region’s instability.191 In contrast, Ray Takeyh argues that the 
administration’s foreign policy agenda led to the historic signing of the Abraham Accords, 
normalizing relations between Israel and the UAE, ultimately setting the stage for a more 
stable Middle East.192 Although the Trump administration prioritized security interests 
over American values, the UAE’s long-standing record on human rights abuses became a 
point of controversy that led to multiple attempts by Congress to block arms sales to the 
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country.193 The most prominent arms deal included fifty F-35 Joint Strike Fighters and 
eighteen MQ-9 Reaper drones associated with UAE’s normalization of relations with 
Israel.194 The controversial arms deal reflected the conflicting nature of the United States’ 
relationship with authoritarian regimes in the Persian Gulf. 
Notwithstanding opposition from Congress, U.S. security policy in the United Arab 
Emirates remained cohesive from 2017 to 2020. There were no changes to the country’s 
foreign policy objectives beyond promoting interoperability and military 
professionalization.195 However, the administration made critical changes affecting the 
transfer of arms technology to foreign nations. First, the administration changed the 
Reagan-era Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the U.S. Conventional Arms 
Transfer Policy to facilitate exporting advanced weapon systems abroad, specifically 
armed drones to the UAE.196 Additionally, the 2017 National Security Strategy made the 
defense industrial base a central tenet of American prosperity requiring “reform [ed] 
regulations and processes to facilitate the export of U.S. military equipment.”197 Notably, 
although the State Department’s 2020 country report documented significant human rights 
abuses in the UAE, including torture, arbitrary arrests, and detention of political 
dissidents,198 the allegations did not appear to affect U.S. foreign policy in the UAE.  
From 2016 to 2020, the United States expanded its commitment to the defense of 
the United Arab Emirates. The two countries signed a new Defensive Cooperation 
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Agreement (DCA) in May 2019, solidifying military-to-military ties and increasing the 
number of U.S. troops and equipment stationed in-country.199 The U.S. also deployed         
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft to Al Dhafra in the wake of escalating tensions with Iran 
marking the first F-35 deployment to the Middle East.200 Additionally, according to the 
Congressional Research Service, the U.S. stationed 3,500 personnel in the UAE.201 The 
3,500 estimate constitutes a significant increase from the 2009–2017 average of 2,000 
personnel stationed in-country.202 The signing of the 2019 DCA, along with the high-
profile aircraft deployments and increased U.S. troop presence, marked a new level of U.S. 
commitment to UAE’s security. 
By 2020, the United States became the UAE’s majority military supplier reflecting 
a new level of U.S. influence. From 2017–2020, the United States delivered thousands of 
surplus tactical vehicles such as the MaxxPro and Caiman APCs. In addition, the United 
States delivered RQ-1 Predator UAVs, HIMARS, AH-64E Apache helicopters, and 
upwards of 18,000 missiles, bombs, and advanced munitions.203 In 2019, the White House 
invoked emergency authorities to bypass Congressional objections and expedite the 
provision of $1 billion of precision-guided munitions to UAE to deter “Iranian adventurism 
in the Gulf.”204 Additionally, the State Department approved the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 
and MQ-9 Reaper sales in late 2020.205 According to U.S. officials, the solid U.S.-UAE 
partnership influenced UAE’s normalization with Israel and enabled the Emirates’ long-
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sought-after F-35 acquisition.206 As a result, the United States became the UAE’s 
definitive military supplier of choice. 
Despite the growing relationship, U.S.-UAE interests remained nominally aligned 
from 2017 to 2020. Beyond the Abraham Accords, the UAE also supported the U.S.-led 
International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) to counter ongoing Iranian attacks 
against commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.207 Additionally, the two nations 
coordinated multiple counterterrorism missions against Al Qaeda in Yemen, culminating 
in the textbook operation liberating the port of Mukalla.208 However, the United States and 
the United Arab Emirates diverged on several issues ranging from human rights to regional 
security. For example, in 2017, the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee charged the 
Secretary of Defense to investigate reports of Emiratis torturing detainees in Yemen.209 
The UAE was also a key instigator of the 2017 Qatar crisis, considered one of the worst 
regional crises to affect the security of the Persian Gulf.210 A third example includes the 
UAE hiring U.S. contractors to spy on critics of the Emirati government, leading to changes 
in U.S. cyber export laws.211 The UAE also actively worked to defeat the United Nations 
and U.S.-supported Libyan government, including arming proxy forces.212 What is unclear 
is the U.S. response occurring through diplomatic channels to address the divergent 
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interests. However, in terms of Iran and Islamist extremism, the two countries’ interests 
remained compatible.  
D. CONCLUSION  
The U.S.-UAE partnership from 2001 to 2020 was functional, although Emirati 
interests defined the relationship. U.S. security policy was cohesive yet extremely limited, 
focusing almost exclusively on establishing military interoperability. By 2020, the UAE 
was considered a highly competent military ally with an arsenal composed of 
predominantly advanced American weaponry. However, despite the UAE’s reputation as 
a capable Arab ally in the region, the U.S. continued to deploy thousands of troops to the 
Emirates to underwrite the nation’s security. Although it is difficult to discern the extent to 
which UAE’s reputation is based on its soft power campaign to win over influential U.S. 
elites, it is noteworthy that Congress tried to block arms transfers to the country based on 
an alarming list of human rights abuses. Nevertheless, the U.S.-UAE relationship remained 
functional throughout the twenty-year period. 
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IV. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This thesis investigated the efficacy of U.S. security cooperation in the Persian Gulf 
to address the disparity between the seventy years of investment and the current state of 
regional instability. The thesis asked why the current instability is so disproportionate to 
the investment, considering the United States equipped the Gulf monarchies with the best 
weapon systems in the world (some exceeding U.S. capability) and provided world-class 
training to sixty thousand of the Gulf monarchies’ best military professionals. The ongoing 
war in Yemen, Iranian attacks on commercial shipping and oil and gas facilities, and 
fractures in the Gulf Cooperation Council are just a few examples that the U.S.-supported 
regional order is in decline.  
In an effort to frame an empirical investigation, the thesis identified several 
contradictions and institutional challenges facing U.S. security cooperation and assistance: 
First, long-standing institutional dissonance exists regarding how to define security sector 
assistance and what it can accomplish. Second, security cooperation remains a puzzle 
within the academic literature and fails to explain or predict the conditions under which 
autocracies cooperate with democratic states. Third, contemporary research suggests that 
the link between cooperation, peace, and stability must be considered a continuous effort 
variously described as an infinite game or enduring competition. In this view, regional 
stability is not a permanent end state, but rather a deliberately defined interim or acceptable 
temporary condition based on limited resources and policy constraints. Consequently, in 
the absence of a deliberately defined and agreed upon interim state, the concept of a stable 
Persian Gulf is open to interpretation. Subsequently, a variety of policy approaches strive 
to accomplish indeterminate goals that are more aspirational than practicable. Notably, the 
official purposes for conducting U.S. security sector assistance codified in statute and in 
joint doctrine fall into this category. Advancing national security interests, developing a 
nation’s security, and building relationships are examples of indeterminate goals that defy 
objective investigation.  
The thesis focused on U.S. efficacy to overcome the contradictions and institutional 
dissonance regarding security sector assistance. The thesis defined U.S. efficacy as the 
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United States’ ability to wield factors within its control to achieve foreign policy goals. 
The literature review identified four primary factors within U.S. control: provision of 
material aid versus non-material aid, type of weapon systems delivered, number of troops 
deployed in-country, and quality or character of the security relationship with the partner 
nation. In turn, the literature suggested four uniformities that define a functional security 
relationship: U.S. policy cohesion, commitment to the partner nation’s defense, controlling 
influence over the partner nation’s defense decisions, and the alignment of interests. 
Notably, the thesis identified that these uniformities are interrelated and mutually 
supportive, thus creating a hierarchical or cascade effect. Cohesive policy is necessary for 
credibility, credibility is essential to signal commitment, commitment is required to achieve 
sufficient influence, and sufficient influence is required to negotiate an alignment of 
interests. All four uniformities are manipulable and define the quality of the security 
partnership for accomplishing U.S. foreign policy goals.  
A. FINDINGS  
In the Saudi Arabia case study, the U.S.-Saudi relationship proved remarkably 
resilient despite clear divergent priorities, primarily Iran and Iraq. While U.S. foreign 
policy was nominally cohesive within each presidential administration’s tenure, U.S. 
policy was nearly incoherent and often contradictory when viewed across tenures. The 
three administrations experimented with radically different policy approaches with Saudi 
Arabia. From 2001–2008, the Bush administration attempted to remake the regional order 
by invading Iraq, a policy Saudi Arabia opposed due to fears that the resulting vacuum 
would strengthen Iran. In the aftermath, the Obama administration experimented with 
disengagement in the Middle East in the belief that regional state and non-state actors could 
stabilize the region if left on their own. In the Saudi view, Obama-era policy again 
benefitted an increasingly assertive Iran. In a reversal of U.S. policy, the Trump 
administration sided against Iran, withdrew from the JCPOA, and recommitted to 
defending Saudi Arabia from Iranian aggression. Across the three presidential 
administrations, the only continuity was the provision of increasingly high-profile arms 
deals framed variously as a symbol of U.S. commitment and, at other times, in direct 
contradiction, as an effort to help the Kingdom assume responsibility for its own defense. 
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While the uniformities associated with a functional security partnership were nominally 
present within each president’s tenure, if viewed across the twenty-year period, the U.S.-
Saudi partnership was dysfunctional and unlikely to produce favorable long-term outcomes 
as intended in U.S. policy. This may explain why security sector assistance increasingly 
focused on realizing benefits rather than achieving foreign policy goals.     
In the United Arab Emirates case study, from 2001 to 2020, the U.S.-UAE security 
partnership remained functional, although the UAE’s interests and strategic vision 
primarily defined the relationship. At the start of the period under study, U.S.-UAE 
relations were at their lowest due to the Emirates’ ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan and 
revelations that two Emirati citizens took part in the 9/11 attacks against the United States. 
The UAE’s association with the 9/11 hijackers and the Taliban undoubtedly played a role 
in the highly publicized 2006 Dubai Ports World controversy in which Congress opposed 
allowing a UAE company to manage U.S. port security. After 2006, the UAE’s aggressive 
soft power campaign to endear itself to the military and foreign policy establishment 
appears to have changed Washington’s perceptions, as evidenced by abundant and 
conspicuously gratuitous praise adopted by Washington elites. Mainly due to UAE’s 
influence campaign, the Emirates emerged as the United States’ preferred military partner 
of choice in the Middle East. Notably, with one exception, the official U.S. policy 
objectives for UAE never extended beyond promoting interoperability and 
professionalization. However, for a short two-year period from 2008 to 2009, the foreign 
policy objectives published in the annual FMTR to Congress included exposing the Emirati 
military to U.S. values and international norms regarding human rights. Except for this 
brief interlude, the U.S. avoided addressing the friction between U.S. values and the UAE’s 
human rights record. The U.S. policy trend away from U.S. values coincided with an 
increased emphasis on deriving maximum economic benefits, culminating in the Trump 
administration’s principled realism, which justified emergency arms sales to the Emirates 
despite ethical reservations from Congress. This may explain why the U.S.-UAE 
relationship flourished only when the United States conformed to UAE’s vision for the 
region. As long as the United States actively opposed Iran, countered Islamist movements, 
and overlooked the Emirates’ human rights record, the relationship prospered, and the UAE 
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and the United States realized the benefits of lucrative arms deals. The uniformities 
associated with a functional security partnership were minimally present across all three 
presidential administrations. However, the security partnership was driven by UAE’s long-
term policy goals for the region as the United States’ long-term policy goals were 
indiscernible apart from optimizing the benefits of the bilateral relationship.  
Based on the theoretical framework, the thesis hypothesized that the U.S. could not 
achieve its foreign policy goals of enhancing regional stability due to dysfunctional 
security partnerships with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The thesis analyzed 
the four security cooperation uniformities in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 
across three presidential administrations and determined that contrary to the main 
hypothesis, U.S. security relationships were nominally functional during each period under 
study. However, the analysis also revealed that enhancing regional stability in the Persian 
Gulf was never an explicit U.S. foreign policy goal after 9/11. In fact, U.S. foreign policy 
increasingly focused on two interconnected activities working at cross-purposes to regional 
stability: 1. transferring the burden of security to regional actors, and 2. optimizing the 
economic benefits of arming regional actors. Thus, the post-9/11 security sector assistance 
paradigm represents a policy shift from pursuing regional policy goals towards realizing 
benefits. As a result, the ongoing state of regional instability in the Persian Gulf appears to 
be partially explained by the unintended consequences of outsourcing responsibility for 
regional security to the highest bidder.   
B. IMPLICATIONS  
In hindsight, Mott’s warning from his 1999 treatise appears prescient when he 
suggested that as arms transfers became more akin to market transactions, the effects of 
security cooperation would devolve unpredictably.213 The case studies outlined in this 
thesis support Mott’s conclusions and imply that the shift in policy focus from goals to 
benefits represents a devolution of security cooperation since the end of the Cold War. 
Absent from the Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates case studies is evidence that 
 
213 Mott IV, Military Assistance: An Operational Perspective, 16.  
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the United States willfully wielded factors within its control to achieve the deliberate 
effects of successful security cooperation. For example, the literature review identified that 
security cooperation efforts that focus on defensive weapon systems, credible troop 
commitments, and nonmaterial aid reduce the probability of regional conflict. Although 
the four uniformities associated with functional partnerships were present in both case 
studies, the United States leveraged its bilateral partnerships to maximize benefits. The 
exclusive focus on security cooperation benefits versus effects was an unexpected finding 
that suggests the link between functional U.S. security partnerships and regional stability 
is unfounded in the post-9/11 paradigm.  
The shift from security cooperation goals and effects to realizing benefits presents 
several implications for practitioners. First, it is unclear how representative the two case 
studies are of post-9/11 security cooperation overall. Likely, Saudi Arabia’s and the United 
Arab Emirates’ vast oil wealth is a unique factor. Additionally, the United States’ 
unsuccessful attempts to promote democracy in the region undoubtedly have complicated 
U.S. policy approaches in the Persian Gulf. However, if the case studies represent broader 
trends, it is unlikely that security cooperation efforts at the sub-policy level, such as at U.S. 
embassy country teams or the combatant commands, can overcome approaches exclusively 
focused on maximizing benefits. Further research is required to parse the differences 
between benefits-based and goals-based approaches, but it appears that benefits-based 
approaches ignore the unintended consequences and the implicit tradeoffs of supporting 
authoritarian regimes. The benefits-based approach also elevates economic benefits over 
the promotion of U.S. values. And since it ignores security cooperation’s effects on partner 
nation’s behavior, the benefits-only approach is not conducive for solving foreign policy 
problems. Subsequently, withholding arms transfers or conditioning security assistance 
and troop commitments on a partner nation’s behavior might risk the loss of some 
significant benefits, but it may be the most effective means for effecting behavioral change. 
Consequently, U.S. security sector assistance policy may need to conform to a goals-
centered approach, thereby sacrificing some benefits, if the U.S. intends to make regional 
peace and stability a policy priority. 
50 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
51 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Abdulla, Gaith A. “The making of UAE Foreign Policy: A ‘Dynamic Process Model.’” 
Occasional paper 84, Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2014. 
https://www.ecssr.ae/en/publication/ the-making-of-uae-foreign-policy-a-
dynamic-process-model. 
Air Force Magazine. “Curtain Up at AFCENT’s Air Warfare Center.” January 9, 2015. 
https://www.airforcemag.com/curtain-up-at-afcents-air-warfare-center/. 
AlArabiyah News. “Saudi Arabia Signs Agreement to Manufacture Russian Weapons 
Locally.” October 5, 2017. https://english.alarabiya.net/News/gulf/2017/10/05/ 
Saudi-Arabian-Military-Industries-signs-agreement-to-manucafture-Russian-
weapons-locally-. 
Al-Dawsari, Nadwa. “Running Around in Circles: How Saudi Arabia is Losing its War in 
Yemen to Iran.” Middle East Institute. March 3, 2020. https://www.mei.edu/ 
publications/running-around-circles-how-saudi-arabia-losing-its-war-yemen-iran. 
Al-Faisal, Turki. “Mr. Obama, we are not ‘Free Riders’.” Arab News. March 14, 2016. 
https://www.arabnews.com/columns/news/894826#.VubddRYBwbU.twitter. 
Al Jazeera. “France to Get Military Base in UAE.” January 16, 2008. https://www. 
aljazeera.com/news/2008/1/16/france-to-get-military-base-in-uae.  
Al-Jazeera. “Saudi to Reassess Relations with US.” October 23, 2013. https://www. 
aljazeera. com/news/2013. 
Alshateri, Albadr AbuBaker. “How Washington Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the 
UAE.” American Diplomacy (Feb 2020). https://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/ 
2020/02/how-washington-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-the-uae/. 
Alterman, Jon B. “Special Report: Iraq and the Gulf States the Balance of Fear.” United 
States Institute of Peace. August 1, 2007. https://www.usip.org/publications/2007/ 
08/iraq-and-gulf-states-balance-fear.  
Baxter, Colin P. Clarke, Emma Cutrufello, Michael McGee, Heather Peterson, Leslie 
Adrienne Payne, and Calin Trenkov-Wermuth. Assessing Security Cooperation as 
a Preventive Tool. RR-350-A. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014. 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR350.html. 
Bandura, Albert. Self-Efficacy: The Exercise of Control. New York: W.H. Freeman, 
1997.  
52 
Carter, Ash. “Remarks by Secretary Carter at the 2016 IISS Manama Dialogue, Manama, 
Bahrain.” Department of Defense. December 10, 2016. https://www.defense.gov/ 
Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1026655/remarks-by-secretary-carter-
at-the-2016-iiss-manama-dialogue-manama-bahrain/. 
BBC. “Saudi Arabia Oil and Gas Production Reduced by Drone Strikes.” September 14, 
2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-49703143. 
BBC. “US Pulls out of Saudi Arabia.” April 29, 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
middle_east/2984547.stm. 
Biddle, Stephen. “Building Security Forces & Stabilizing Nations: The Problem of 
Agency.” Daedalus 146, no. 4 (October 2017): 126–38. https://doi.org/10.1162/ 
DAED_a_00464. 
Blanchard, Christopher M. and Richard F. Grimmett. The Gulf Security Dialogue and 
Related Arms Sale Proposals. CRS Report no. RL34322. Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2008. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/ 
RL34322.pdf. 
Blanchard, Christopher M. Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations. CRS Report 
No. RL33533. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2020. 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/ product/pdf/RL/RL33533. 
Bloomberg. “Fear of U.S. Neglect Fades with Islamic State Fight UAE Says.” January 8, 
2015. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-08/fear-of-u-s-neglect-
fades-with-islamic-state-fight-u-a-e-says. 
Borshchevskaya, Anna. “The Tactical Side of Russia’s Arms Sales to the Middle East.” 
In Russia in the Middle East, edited by Theodore Karasik and Stephen Blank, 
183–211. Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, 2018. https://jamestown.org/
wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Russia-in-the-Middle-East-online.pdf?x87069. 
Boucher, Richard. “The U.S.-UAE Strategic Dialogue Meetings.” Department of State. 
November 6, 2002. https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/14960.htm. 
Brooks, Stephen G., G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth. “Lean Forward: In 
Defense of American Engagement.” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 1 (2013): 130–42. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/41721010. 
Bumgarder, Richard. “MOI-MAG Advise and Train in Saudi Arabia.” U.S. Army Public 
Affairs. November 6, 2019. https://www.army.mil/article/229552/moi_mag_ 
advise_and_train_in_saudi_arabia. 
Bzostek, Rachel, and Samuel Robison. “U.S. Policy toward Israel, Iraq, and Saudi 
Arabia: An Integrated Analysis, 1981–2004.” International Studies Perspectives 
9, no. 4 (2008): 359–376. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1528-3585.2008.00342.x. 
53 
CBS. “Trump to Hear Military Options on Iran as Saudis Show Oil Site Damage.” 
September 20, 2019. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump-iran-military-
options-saudi-arabia-shows-damage-aramco-oil-facility-khurais-today-2019-09-
20/. 
Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. “In the UAE, the United States has a Quiet, Potent Ally 




Childs, Steven J. “Granting Security? U.S. Security Assistance Programs and Political 
Stability in the Greater Middle East and Africa.” Journal of the Middle East and 
Africa 10, no. 2 (April 3, 2019): 157–82. https://doi.org/10.1080/21520844. 
2019.1596649. 
CNN. “Saudi Arabia Rejects Participation in War Against Iraq.” March 18, 2003. 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/18/sprj.irq.saudi/. 
CNN. “Some Discontent Brews Between Saudi Arabia, U.S.” CNN. January 30, 2002. 
http://edition.cnn. com/TRANSCRIPTS/0201/30/lad.01.html. 
Dalton, Melissa G., Hijab Shah, Tommy Ross, and Asya Akca. Shifting the Burden 
Responsibly: Oversight and Accountability in U.S. Security Sector Assistance. 
Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019. 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/shifting-burden-responsibly-oversight-and-
accountability-us-security-sector-assistance. 
Davidson, Christopher M. From Sheikhs to Sultanism: Statecraft and Authority in Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. 
Defense Industry Daily. “The Most Advanced F-16s in the World aren’t American.” 
December 09, 2020. https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/the-uaes-f-16-block-
60-desert-falcon-fleet-04538/. 
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) (Total Military, Civilian, and Dependent 
Strengths by Regional Area and by Country; accessed June 15, 2021). 
https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-data-reports/workforce-reports. 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency. “Major Arms Sales Notifications November 
2020.” Accessed August 11, 2021. https://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/
archive-date/202011. 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency. “DSCA Historical Sales Book.” Accessed June 
24, 2021. https://www.dsca.mil/resources/dsca-historical-sales-book. 
54 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency. “Saudi Arabia-Terminal High Altitude Area 
Defense and Related Support, Equipment and Services.” Oct 6, 2017. 
https://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/ files/mas/saudi_arabia_17-28.pdf. 
Dempsey, Martin. “Thoughts on the Future of the Gulf.” Presentation, Center for 
Strategic & International Studies, Washington, DC, March 18, 2013. 
https://www.csis.org/events/gulf-roundtable-cjcs-general-martin-e-dempsey. 
Department of State. “2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: United Arab 
Emirates.” Accessed August 11, 2021, https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-
country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/united-arab-emirates/.  
Department of State. “Foreign Military Training and DOD Engagement Activities of 
Interest.” Accessed July 24, 2021. https://www.state.gov/foreign-military-
training-and-dod-engagement-activities-of-interest/. 
Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson. “Launch of the Sawab Center.” July 8, 
2015. https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/07/244709.htm. 
Dris-Aït-Hamadouche, Louisa, and Yahia H. Zoubir. “The US-Saudi Relationship and 
the Iraq War: The Dialectics of a Dependent Alliance.” Journal of Third World 
Studies 24, no.1 (Spring 2007): 109–135. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45194355. 
D’Urso, Stefano. “The Most Advanced Version of the F-15 Eagle, the F-15QA, Just 
Made its First Flight.” Business Insider. April 17, 2020. 
https://www.businessinsider.com/most-advanced-version-of-f15-eagle-f15qa-
made-first-flight-2020-4 
Echevarria II, Antulio. “The Problem of Stability: Military Strategy in a Non-Newtonian 
Universe.” Military Strategy Magazine 7, no. 1 (Spring 2020): 12–16, 
https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/volume/7/issue/1/. 
Egel, Daniel, Adam R. Grissom, John P. Grodges, Jennifer Kavanagh, and Howard Shatz. 
Estimating the Value of Overseas Security Commitments. RR-518-AF. Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2016. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_ reports/
RR518.html. 
Elliot, Adriane. “Antiballistic System Shared with International Partner.” U.S. Army 
Public Affairs. January 13, 2016, https://www.army.mil/article/160912/ 
antiballistic_system_shared_with_international_partner. 




Fauconnet, Cécile, Julien Malizard & Antoine Pietri. “French Arms Exports and 
Intrastate Conflicts: An Empirical Investigation.” Defense and Peace Economics 
30, no. 2 (Feb 2019): 176–196. https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2018.1488371. 
Foley, Sean. “The Gulf Arabs and the New Iraq: the Most to Gain and the Most to Lose?” 
Middle East Review of International Affairs 7, no. 2 (June 2003): 24–43. 
https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/meria/meria03_fos01.html  
Fürtig, Henner. “Conflict and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf: The Interregional Order 
and U.S. Policy.” Middle East Journal 61, no. 4 (Autumn 2007): 627–640. 
https://doi.org/10.3751/61.4.13. 
Garamone, Jim. “Iran Shoots Down U.S. Global Hawk Operating in International 
Airspace.” U.S. Department of Defense. June 20, 2019. https://www.defense.gov/ 
Explore/News/Article/Article/1882497/iran-shoots-down-us-global-hawk-
operating-in-international-airspace/. 
Gause III, F. Gregory. “Saudi Arabia: How Much Change?” In The Contemporary 
Middle East in an Age of Upheaval, ed, edited by James L. Gelvin, 155–169. 
Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1515/ 
9781503627703. 
Georgi, Lydia. “U.S. Seeks to Formalize Military Links with the UAE.” The Daily Star 
Lebanon. January 13, 2005. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/ArticlePrint.aspx?id 
=64518&mode=print. 
Gerges, Fawaz. “The Obama Approach to the Middle East: The End of America’s 
Moment?” International Affairs 89, no. 2 (2013): 299–323. https://doi.org/10. 
1111/1468-2346.12019. 
Gordon, Michael R., and Eric Schmitt. “Aftereffects: Bases; U.S. will Move Air 
Operations to Qatar Base.” New York Times. April 28, 2003. https://www.nytimes. 
com/2003/04/28/world/aftereffects-bases-us-will-move-air-operations-to-qatar-
base.html 
Grant, Rebecca. “The Short, Strange Life of PSAB.” Air Force Magazine. July 1, 2012. 
https://www.airforcemag.com/article/0712psab/. 
Hassan, Islam Khalid. “GCC’s 2014 Crisis: Causes, Issues and Solutions,” Aljazeera 
Centre for Studies, March 31, 2015, https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/dossiers/ 2015/
03/201533172623652531.html. 
Helou, Agnes. “Amid Western Arms Embargoes on Saudi Arabia, SAMI has a Backup 




Hokayem, Emile, and David B. Roberts, “The War in Yemen.” Survival 58, no. 6 (Nov 
2016): 157–186. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2016.1257202. 
Human Rights Watch. “Yemen: Events of 2019.” January 14, 2020. https://www.hrw.org/ 
world-report/2020/country-chapters/yemen. 
Huth, Paul K. “Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War.” American Political 
Science Review 82, no. 2 (June 1988): 423–443. https://doi.org/10.2307/1957394. 
Ibish, Hussein. “The UAE’s Evolving National Security Strategy.” Occasional paper 4, 
Gulf States Institute in Washington, 2017. https://agsiw.org/uaes-evolving-
national-security-strategy/. 
Ibish, Hussein. “Why U.S. Saudi Relations are Facing an Unprecedented Crisis.” Policy 
and Governance-Saudi Arabia (blog). May 11, 2020. https://agsiw.org/why-u-s-
saudi-relations-are-facing-an-unprecedented-crisis/.  
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The Military Balance. London: IISS, 
2001–2020. https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tmib20. 
Jacobs, Anna L. “Resolution of Gulf Rift Not Likely to Mend Fault Lines in North 
Africa.” The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. January 21, 2021. 
https://agsiw.org/resolution-of-gulf-rift-not-likely-to-mend-fault-lines-in-north-
africa/.  
Joint Chiefs of Staff. “Competition Continuum.” Joint Doctrine Note 1–19. Washington, 
DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2019. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/ 
Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn1_19.pdf. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Security Cooperation. JP 3-20. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2017. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_20_ 
20172305.pdf 
Kamrava, Mehran. Troubled Waters: Insecurity in the Persian Gulf. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2018.  
Karam, Joyce. “US F-35 Sale to UAE Shows Regional Shifts and Improves Emirati 
Deterrence in Region.” National News UAE. November 10, 2020. 
https://www.thenationalnews.com/uae/government/us-f-35-sale-to-uae-shows-
regional-shifts-and-improves-emirati-deterrence-in-region-1.1109373. 
Karlin, Mara E. Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018. 
Katzman, Kenneth. The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy. CRS 
Report no. RS21852. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005–
2008. https://apps.dtic.mil/. 
57 
Kerr, Paul K. U.S.-Proposed Missile Technology Control Regime Changes, CRS Report 
No. IF11069. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2021. 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=IF11069. 
Khatib, Line. “Syria, Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E. and Qatar: the ‘Sectarianization’ of the 
Syrian Conflict and Undermining of Democratization in the Region.” British 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 46, no. 3 (2019): 385–403. https://doi.org/ 
10.1080/13530194.2017.1408456. 
Kinsella, David Todd. “Stability and Instability in Third World Security Complexes: The 
Role of Arms Transfers.” Political Science faculty publications and presentations, 
Portland State University, Jan 2013. https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/polisci 
_fac/1. 
Kinsella, David Todd. “Arms Transfers, Dependence, and Regional Stability: Isolated 
Effects or General Patterns?” Political Science faculty publications and 
resentations, Portland State University, Feb 2019. https://pdxscholar.library. 
pdx.edu/polisci_fac/10. 
Kydd, Andrew H. “Game Theory and the Future of International Security.” In The 
Oxford Handbook of International Security, edited by Alexander Gheciu and 
William C. Wohlforth, 1–16. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198777854.001.0001.  
Ladwig, Walter C. The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relationships in 
Counterinsurgency. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. 
Lambeth, Benjamin S. Air Power Against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operations 
Enduring Freedom. MG-166-1-CENTAF. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005. 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/ monographs/MG166-1.html.  
Long, David E. “US-Saudi Arabia Diplomatic Relations: An Evolutionary Process.” In 
Handbook of US-Middle East Relations: Formative Factors and Regional 
Perspectives, edited by Robert E. Looney, 403–416. New York: Routledge, 2014. 
Losey, Stephen. “F-35A Deploys to Middle East for First Time.” Air Force Times. April 
15, 2019. https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2019/04/15/f-35-
deploys-to-middle-east-for-first-time/. 
Lynch, Colum. “Saudis Shock U.N., Quit Security Council Over Syria.” Foreign Policy. 
October 18, 2013. https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/10/18/saudis-shock-u-n-quit-
security-council-over-syria/. 
Maclean, William, Noah Browning, and Yara Bayoumy. “Yemen Counter-Terrorism 




MacDonald, Alex. “Barack Obama’s Legacy in the Middle East: Six Things we Learned 
from ‘A Promised Land.’” Middle East Eye. November 17, 2020, 
https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/barack-obama-promised-land-middle-east-
we-learned. 
Mackinnon, Amy. “The Conflict in Libya is Getting Even Messier.” Foreign Policy. 
February 4, 2021. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/02/04/libya-conflict-un-report-
uae-haftar/. 
Magesan, Arvind, and Eik Swee. “Out of the Ashes, Into the Fire: The Consequences of 
U.S. Weapons Sales for Political Violence.” European Economic Review 107, no. 
1 (August 2018): 133–156. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.05.003. 
Matisek, Jahara. “The Crisis of American Military Assistance: Strategic Dithering and 
Fabergé Egg Armies.” Defense and Security Analysis 34, no. 3 (Aug 2018): 267–
290. https://doi.org/10/1080/14751798. 2018.1500757. 
McInnis, Kathleenn and Nathan Lucas. What Is ‘Building Partner Capacity? Issues for 
Congress. CRS Report No. R44313. Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2015. https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=789241. 
McNerney, Michael J., Angela O’Mahony, Thomas S. Szayna, Derek Eaton, Caroline 
Baxter, Colin P. Clarke, Emma Cutrufello, Michael McGee, Heather Peterson, 
Leslie Adrienne Payne, and Calin Trenkov-Wermuth. Assessing Security 
Cooperation as a Preventive Tool. RR-350-A. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014. 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR350.html. 
Middle East Eye. “New U.S. Law Says Intelligence Agencies Must Report Risks of Ex-
Spies Working Overseas.” January 22, 2020. https://www.middleeasteye.net/ 
news/new-us-law-says-intelligence-agencies-must-report-risks-ex-spies-working-
overseas. 
Middle East Eye. “Trump Warned Saudis to Cut Oil Supply or Lose U.S. Military 
Support.” April 30, 2020. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/trump-warned-
saudis-cut-oil-supply-or-lose-us-military-support-report. 
Miller, Andrew and Daniel Mahanty. “U.S. Security Aid Is a Faith-Based Policy.” Just 
Security, April 14, 2020. https://www.justsecurity.org/69533/u-s-security-aid-is-
a-faith-based-policy/. 
Miller, Andrew, and Richard Sokolsky. “What Has $49 Billion in Foreign Military Aid 
Bought Us? Not Much.” The American Conservative. Feb 27, 2018. 
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/ what-has-49-billion-in-
foreign-military-aid-bought-us-not-much/. 
Mott IV, William H. Military Assistance: An Operational Perspective. Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 1999. 
59 
Mott IV, William H. United States Military Assistance: An Empirical Perspective. 
Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002.  
Mueller, Karl P., Becca Wasser, Jeffrey Martini, and Stephen Watts. U.S. Strategic 
Interests in the Middle East and Implications for the Army. PE-265-A. Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2017. https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE265.html. 
Müller, Harald. “Security Cooperation.” In Handbook of International Relations, edited 
by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A Simmons, 607–627. Thousand 
Oaks: Sage Publications, 2013. 
National News UAE. “On the Frontline with UAE Forces in Helmand.” July 22, 2011. 
https://www.thenationalnews.com/uae/on-the-frontline-with-uae-forces-in-
helmand-1.423315. 
Nederveen, Gilles Van. “The F-16 Block 60: A High-Tech Aircraft for a Volatile 
Region.” Air & Space Power Journal 14 no. 3 (September 2000): 96–98, 
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-14_Issue-1-4/
2000_Vol14_No3.pdf. 
Neuman, Scott. “UAE Agrees to Join U.S.-Led Maritime Coalition to Protect Gulf 
Shipping.” National Public Radio. September 19, 2019. https://www.npr.org/ 
2019/09/19/762225417/uae-agrees-to-join-u-sled-maritime-coalition-to-protect-
gulf-shipping. 
Obaid, Nawaf. “Amid the Arab Spring, a U.S.- Saudi Split.” Washington Post. May 15, 
2011. https://www.washingtonpost.com/ opinions/amid-the-arab-spring-a-us-
saudi-split/2011/05/13/AFMy8Q4G_story.html. 
Office of Inspector General United States Department of State. Review of the Department 
of State’s Role in Arms Transfers to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates. Report no. ISP-I-20-19. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
State, 2020. https://www.stateoig.gov/system/files/isp-i-20-19.pdf. 
Office of the United States Trade Representative. “United Arab Emirates National Trade 
Estimate.” 2010. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/reports/2010/NTE/ 
2010_NTE_UAE_final.pdf. 
O’Mahony Angela, Miranda Priebe, Bryan Frederick, Jennifer Kavanagh, Matthew Lane, 
Trevor Johnston, Thomas S. Szayna, Jakub P. Hlavka, Stephen Watts, Matthew 
Povlock. U.S. Presence and the Incidence of Conflict. RR-1906-A. Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 2018. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1906.html. 
Ottaway, David. “The King and Us: U.S.-Saudi Relations in the Wake of 9/11.” Foreign 
Affairs 88, no.3 (May/June 2009): 121–31. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ 
articles/middle-east/2009-05-01/king-and-us. 
60 
Pollack, Ken. “Obama’s Foreign Policy and the Future of the Middle East.” Presentation 
at Middle East Policy Council’s 77th Capitol Hill Conference, Washington, DC, 
July 21, 2014. https://mepc.org/obamas-foreign-policy-and-future-middle-east. 
Qiblawi, Tamara, Mohammed Tawfeeq, Elizabeth Roberts and Hamdi Alkhshali. “Qatar 
Rift: Saudi, UAE, Bahrain, Egypt Cut Diplomatic Ties.” CNN, July 27, 2017. 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/05/middleeast/saudi-bahrain-egypt-uae-qatar-
terror/index.html. 
Raisbeck, Gordon. “How the Choice of Measures of Effectiveness Constrains 
Operational Analysis.” Interfaces 9, no. 4, (August 1979): 85–93. https://doi.org/ 
10.1287/inte.9.4.85. 
Reuters. “Exclusive: Trump Administration Advances $2.9 Billion Drone Sale to UAE.” 
November 5, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-emirates-drones-
exclusive/exclusive-trump-administration-advances-2-9-billion-drone-sale-to-uae-
sources-idUSKBN27M06L. 
Reuters. “Saudi Arabia Warns of Shift Away from U.S. over Syria, Iran.” October 22, 
2013. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-usa/saudi-arabia-warns-of-shift-
away-from-u-s-over-syria-iran-idUSBRE99L0K120131022. 
Reuters. “Senators Demand Investigation of Reports of Torture in Yemen.” June 23, 
2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-prisons-usa-congress/senators-
demand-investigation-of-reports-of-torture-in-yemen-idUSKBN19E2GZ. 
Reuters. “UAE, U.S. Activate Defense Cooperation Pact.” May 29, 2019. 
https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-usa-emirates-defence-bolton/uae-u-s-activate-
defence-cooperation-pact-state-news-agency-idUSKCN1SZ2OB. 
Reveron, Derek. Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, 
and the Changing Face of the U.S. Military. Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2016. 
Riedel, Bruce O. Kings and Presidents: Saudi Arabia and the United States Since FDR. 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2018. 
Rovner, Joshua, and Caitlin Talmadge. “Hegemony, Force Posture, and the Provision of 
Public Goods: The Once and Future Role of Outside Powers in Securing Persian 
Gulf Oil.” Security Studies 23, no. 3 (August 2014): 548–581. https://doi.org/10. 
1080/15325024.2014.935224. 
Rudloff, Peter, and James Scott, “Buying Trouble? The Impact of Foreign Assistance on 
Conflict in Direct and Indirect Rivalry Situations.” All Azimuth 3, no. 1, (Jan 
2014): 35–54, https://doi.org/10.20991/allazimuth.167320. 
61 
Saab, Bilal Y. “Broken Partnerships: Can Washington Get Security Cooperation Right?” 
The Washington Quarterly 42, no. 3 (July 3, 2019): 77–89. https://doi.org/ 
10.1080/0163660X.2019.1663120. 
Sanjian, Gregory S. “Promoting Stability or Instability? Arms Transfers and Regional 
Rivalries, 1950–1991.” International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 4 (December 
1999): 641–670. https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00140. 
Sciutto, Jim. “U.S. Troops Preparing for War in Qatar.” ABC. January 7, 2006. 
https://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=130093&page=1. 
Sharp, Jeremy M., Sarah R. Collins, and Christopher M. Blanchard. Congress and the 
War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015–2020. CRS Report No. R45046. 
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2020). 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45046/22 
Simon, Steven. “Iran and President Trump: What is the Endgame?” Survival 60 no. 4 
(July 2018): 7–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2018.1494975. 
SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates 2000–2020; 
accessed April 27, 2021). https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers. 
Soubrier, Emma. “Global and Regional Crises, Empowered Gulf Rivals, and the 
Evolving Paradigm of Regional Security.” In Shifting Global Politics in the 
Middle East, edited by Marc Lynch and Amaney Jamal, 63–66. Washington, DC: 
POMEPS, 2019. https://pomeps.org/pomeps-studies-34-shifting-global-politics-
and-the-middle-east. 
Soubrier, Emma. “The Weaponized Gulf Riyal Politik(s) and Shifting Dynamics of the 
Global Arms Trade.” The Economics of Peace and Security Journal 15, no. 1 
(April 17, 2020): 49–57. https://doi.org/10.15355/epsj.15.1.49. 
Spetalnick, Matt, and Idrees Ali. “U.S. Deploying Carrier, Bombers to Middle East to 
Deter Iran: Bolton.” Reuters. May 5, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-iran/u-s-deploying-carrier-bombers-to-middle-east-to-deter-iran-bolton-
idUSKCN1SC01B. 
Stewart, Phil. “U.S. Signs New Defense Accord with Gulf Ally UAE.” Reuters. May 16, 
2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-emirates-military/u-s-signs-new-
defense-accord-with-gulf-ally-uae-idUSKCN18C1TN. 
Sullivan, Patricia L., Brock F. Tessman, and Xiaojun Li. “US Military Aid and Recipient 
State Cooperation.” Foreign Policy Analysis 7, no. 3 (July 2011): 275–94, 
https://doi.org/10.1111 /j.1743-8594.2011.00138.x. 
62 
Takeyh, Ray. “Trump’s Parting Gift to Biden: A more Stable Middle East.” Foreign 
Policy. November 16, 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/16/trump-biden-
iran-israel-uae-middle-east/. 
Terrill, W. Andrew. Regional Fear of Western Primacy and the Future of U.S. Middle 
Eastern Basing Policy. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006. 
http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep11627.  
Thomas, Clayton, Christopher M. Blanchard, Jeremy M. Sharp, and Christina L. Arabia. 
Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. 
Policy. CRS Report No. R44984. Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2020. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R44984. 
Thrall, A. Trevor, and Caroline Dorminey. “Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in 
U.S. Foreign Policy.” CATO Institute. Mar 13, 2018. https://www.cato.org/ 
policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy. 
Trump, Donald. “Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia.” Official 
memorandum. Washington, DC: Office of the President, 2019. https://www.hsdl. 
org/?abstract&did=832258.  
Trump, Donald. National Security Presidential Memorandum on United States 
Conventional Arms Transfer Policy (NSPM-10). April 19, 2018. 
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=825730. 
UAE Embassy to the United States. “Reliable Allies for 41 Years.”Accessed June 30, 
2021. https://www.uae-embassy.org/uae-us-relations/reliable-allies-41-years. 
Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates. “Fire and Fury in the Gulf.” IndraStra Global 4, no.2 (2018): 
1–8. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-55716-2. 
Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates. “Implications of the Qatar Crisis for Regional Security in the 
Gulf.” AlSharq Strategic Research. June 29, 2017. https://research.sharqforum.org 
/06/29/implications-of-the-qatar-crisis-for-regional-security-in-the-gulf/.  
Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates. “Small States with a Big Role: Qatar and the United Arab 
Emirates in the Wake of the Arab Spring.” Discussion paper, Durham University, 
2012. https://dro.dur.ac.uk/10011/1/ 10011.pdf. 
Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates. The United Arab Emirates: Power, Politics and 
Policymaking. New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Review of Maritime 
Transport 2019. UNCTAD/RMT/2019/Corr.1. Geneva: United Nations, 2019. 
https://unctad.org/system/files/ official-document/rmt2019_en.pdf. 
63 
United States Code. Title 10 - Armed Forces. Section 301, Definitions (2018). 
https://www.govinfo.gov/ content/pkg/USCODE-2018-title10/html/USCODE-
2018-title10-subtitleA-partI-chap16-subchapI-sec301.htm 
U.S. Congress, Senate. To Direct the Removal of United States Armed Forces from 
Hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been Authorized by Congress. 
S.J. Res. 7. 116th Cong., 1st sess. (2019-2020). https://www.congress.gov/bill/ 
116th-congress/senate-joint-resolution/7. 
U.S. Marine Corps Public Affairs. “Personnel Sourcing Guidance in Support of Marine 




U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. “Menendez Demands Investigation into 
Reports that UAE Illegally Gave U.S. Arms to Libyan Militants.” July 02, 2019. 
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/rankings/release/ menendez-demands-
investigation-into-reports-that-uae-illegally-gave-us-arms-to-libyan-militants. 
Valine, Debra. “United Arab Emirates gets Air Defense Boost from U.S.” U.S. Army 
Public Affairs. March 20, 2019. https://www.army.mil/article/218898/united_ 
arab_emirates_gets_air_defense_boost_from_u_s. 
Walt, Stephen M. “The Relationship Between Theory and Policy in International 
Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science, 8 (November 2005): 23–48. 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev/polisci.7.012003. 104904. 
White House. “Fact Sheet: The United States-UAE Bilateral Relationship.” February 
2006. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/02/ 
20060222-10.html. 
White House. “Fact Sheet: U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy.” April 05, 2013. 
https://www.hsdl.org/ ?abstract&did=747214. 
White House. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, 
DC: White House, 2010. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/ 
files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. 
White House. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. (Washington, 
DC: White House, 2017). https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/ 
uploads /2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. 




White House Office of the Press Secretary. “Presidential Policy Directive—United States 
Conventional Arms Transfer Policy (PPD-27).” January 15, 2014. 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/15/presidential-
policy-directive-united-states-conventional-arms-transfer-p. 
White House Office of the Press Secretary. “Statement by NSC Spokesman Bernadette 
Meehan on the Situation in Yemen.” March 25, 2015. https://obamawhitehouse. 
archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/25/ statement-nsc-spokesperson-
bernadette-meehan-situation-yemen. 
White House Office of the Press Secretary. “U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council Camp David 
Joint Statement.” May 14, 2015. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2015/05/14/us-gulf-cooperation-council-camp-david-joint-statement. 
Williams, Paul. “President Obama’s Approach to the Middle East and North Africa: 
Strategic Absence.” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 48, no. 1 
(2016). https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol48/iss1/5.  
Wilkins, Thomas S. “‘Alignment’, Not ‘alliance’ – the Shifting Paradigm of International 
Security Cooperation: Toward a Conceptual Taxonomy of Alignment.” Review of 
International Studies 38, no. 1 (Jan 2012): 53–76. http://www.jstor.org/stable/ 
41485490. 
Worth, Robert F. “Mohammed bin Zayed’s Dark Vision of the Middle East’s Future.” 
New York Times. January 9, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/09/ 
magazine/united-arab-emirates-mohammed-bin-zayed.html. 
Worth, Robert. “Saudi Arabia Rejects U.N. Security Council Seat in Protest Move.” New 
York Times. October 18, 2013. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/19/world/ 
middleeast/saudi-arabia-rejects-security-council-seat.html. 
Yarhi-Milo, Keren, Alexander Lanoszka, and Zack Cooper. “To Arm or to Ally? The 
Patron’s Dilemma and the Strategic Logic of Arms Transfers and Alliances.” 





INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
